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Abstract
The emerging advances in wireless communications make it an essential component of our
everyday life. Moreover, the current research aims towards involving wireless communications
in health monitoring applications, which helps medical personnel to remotely keep track of the
development of the condition of their patients. Such information is considered highly sensitive and
may cause significant harm if acquired by an adversary. The wireless environment has a broadcast
type of nature, where the emitted electromagnetic waves spread all over the surrounding area of
the transmitting antenna. This broadcast nature raises considerable concern about the secrecy of
this sensitive information while being transmitted over-air.
On another side, the advancement in computer algorithms makes the currently adopted
cryptographic algorithms prone to multiple attacks, which facilitate the access to the initially trans-
ferred information. In such a context, another approach is required to avoid the exposure of the
information. Concealing the information at the physical layer of communications systems be-
came of enormous interest to overcome the shortages in cryptographic approaches. One feature of
the physical-layer is the availability of multiple transmit/receive antennas. The multiple antennas
structure allows us to manipulate the spatial construction of the transmitted signals. The spatial
construction of the signal allows us to limit the area, where any receiver in the system can detect
the signal.
vii
Our Studies focus on providing both secure and reliable communications, and we can char-
acterize the studies in the following approaches,
• Location-Based Secure Communications: We established the ground for multiple directions
transmission techniques, where each transmission direction carries an independent set of
information. Using this ground, we proposed multiple approaches that limit the availability
of the information to the small area surrounding the target receiver.
• Complexity Reduction for Multi-Direction Systems: With the increase in the physical re-
sources, the complexity of the system increases. We proposed a simplified structure for the
system that reduces the complexity from three orders of magnitude to a single order of mag-
nitude. Moreover, we introduced a limited feedback scheme, that reduces the overhead used
in the system.
• Enhancing the System Capacity: Due to the increase in the number of wireless users, higher
data transmission rates need to exist. Using Directional transmission, we were able to in-
telligently allow the overlap of different data streams on the same available physical re-
source. This overlap allows the reuse of the same resource for different users, and increase
the achievable transmission rates.
viii
Chapter 1: Introduction
After the wireless communication advancement provided by different versions of long-
term-evolution (LTE), the mobile wireless networks became a corner stone for most of our daily
life activities. Moreover, with their widespread, the wireless paved the way for many new tech-
nologies, that were considered just as a futuristic vision a couple of years ago. 3GPP lunched the
development of a new standard that will provide these emerging technologies with the required
framework, namely 5G networks, also known as new-radio (NR) networks [1].
The NR framework is divided into three main categories. enhanced mobile broadband
(eMBB), which is concerned with improving the services provided to the mobile end-user (e.g.,
increasing the throughput achieved by the user to get a better video streaming experience). ultra-
reliable low-latency communications (URLLC), which is concerned by time sensitive applications
(e.g., remotely operated machinery, and smart driving). massive machine type communications
(mMTC), which is concerned by providing services for a high volume of devices (e.g., implantable
medical devices). Each of these categories has a set of requirements that need to be met, an
illustration of the 5G components and their relative requirements is represented in Table 1.1.
In order to fulfill those requirements, some key concepts were defined as enablers of the
5G networks. This includes, but not limited to:
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Table 1.1: 5G-NR Service Categories and Requirements
Category Requirements
Enhanced Mobile
Broadband (eMBB)
• Very high capacity (10 Tbps/Km2)
• Very high data rates (100+ Mbps/user)
Ultra Reliable Low-Latency
Communications (URLLC)
• High mobility support
• Very low latency (1ms)
• Very high reliability (< 10−5 packet loss rate)
• Strong security
Massive Machine-Type
Communications (mMTC)
• High density (106 nodes/Km2)
• Low complexity
• Low energy consumption
• Cover challenging areas
• Flexible Waveform: As mentioned 5G is aimed to serve a wide variety of applications. Each
of these applications has a different set of performance requirements, some would focus on
total capacity, others will concern about latency. The current fixed frame structure, along
with the strict waveform, will not be suitable to provide such experience. In order to cope
with this variations, a flexible frame structure and waveform are needed. For the frame
structure flexibility, the concept of numerology was introduced [2, 3]. while, for waveform,
multiple variations were proposed (e.g., GFDM [4], FBMC [5], etc.).
• Massive MIMO: The huge number of antennas results in changing the structure of the wire-
less channel, and provides more degrees of freedom. Massive MIMO [6], reduce the pro-
cessing load at the receiver side, which is beneficial for low power devices. Moreover, it has
natural secure nature, which is necessary for the transfer of sensitive information. On the
other side, it requires a full knowledge of the channel, which may not be practical.
• Millimeter Wave Communications: With the congestion of the currently used frequency
bands (i.e., below 6 GHz), the move to the mm-Wave range opens a large space of pos-
sibilities [7]. The challenge in that range resides in the change of the wave propagation
characteristics, where the signal attenuation is much larger. From another side, operating in
mm-Wave range allows for a compact antenna arrays structures, which facilitate the deploy-
ment of several beam-forming approaches.
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• Heterogeneous Networks: HetNets is a multi-tier network, with each tier serving a different
set of users or applications [8]. The network can consist of a large coverage cell “Macro
Cell”, a small coverage cell “Pico/Femto-Cell”, and a device to device tier “D2D Link”.
This tiered structure would highly facilitate the deployment of the multi-service system. The
downsides of such structure include high overhead signaling and high latency.
• Non-Orthogonal Multiple Access: As the number of devices is expected to be enormous, and
the available resources is always limited, either due to scarcity or technology limitations,
sharing these resources between users is a necessity. NOMA [9] provides an approach to
multiplex multiple users into the same resource, with an additional complexity to the users
that can afford it. NOMA definitely increases the overall capacity of the system, but requires
some intelligent and careful signal handling.
• Physical Layer Security: Because of the introduction of some IOT [10] applications to the
wireless devices (e.g., remote operations, and medical monitoring [11]), more sensitive data
transferred over the air. This huge amount of sensitive data need to be carefully handled in
order not to fall in the hands of adversaries. Channel characteristics can be used to provide
a secure communication link, with a trade off between the provided secrecy and limiting the
capacity of the system, or increasing the complexity [12].
With These concepts in mind, the work presented here will be focusing on providing an
enhanced multi-user experience in terms of both secrecy and total achievable rates. In order to
provide such experience we will be using the directional ability of the multiple antenna systems.
Directional transmission can be considered as a feature of both massive MIMO and mm-Wave
communications. This is based on the fact that the large number of antennas and limited propaga-
tion conditions will make the communication channel more directional based. Besides, in order to
stay in line with the 5G spirit, some algorithms will be proposed to reduce complexity and latency,
which can make the suggested scheme have a more practical structure.
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Directional transmission provide some sort of secrecy by default. This occurs because the
signal is magnified towards a single direction while having a limited reach towards other directions.
We will be utilizing this feature to further enhance the secrecy of all the users in the network.
Moreover, This limited spread of the signal provide additional degrees of freedom that would
allow achieving higher rates in a practical way. We will be taking advantage of this limitation to
enhance the performance of the NOMA approach. This limitation helps reducing the amount of
pre-processing required to multiplex the users under NOMA scheme.
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows:
• in Chapter 2: we provide a review for the basic knowledge required in the area of multiple
antennas systems and physical-layer security.
• in Chapter 3: we present some newly developed algorithms that targets the enhancement of
secrecy and achievable communication rate.
• in Chapter 4: We discuss a practical training experience in the 5G-NR area.
• in Chapter 5: we conclude the presented work.
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Chapter 2: Background
In this Chapter we will review some of the basic concepts, that the proposed solutions
are build upon. First, we will review the multi-antenna systems, with different signal process-
ing approaches and physical structures. Second, The channel models for these systems will be
visited. Then, the concept of physical-layer security will be discussed. Finally, the basics of non-
orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) will be reviewed.
2.1 Multi-Antenna System
The usage of multiple antennas for communications system caused a huge advantage in the
mobile technology. The communication rate is limited because of the channel phenomenon called
as fading. Fading is the fluctuations appear in the signal level due to delay-spread (frequency
selectivity), Doppler-spread (time selectivity), and/or angular spread (spatial selectivity). With the
limitations of transmission power and available frequency-bandwidth, fading is the limiting factor
for possible increases in communication data rates. Introducing multiple antennas technology
made it possible to increase the achievable rates, which would be linearly proportional to the
number of used antennas. This section will discuss the benefits and drawbacks of multiple antenna
system, along with transceiver design.
2.1.1 Benefits and Trade-Offs
Here we will present some of the benefits and trade-offs associated with the multiple an-
tenna systems, and discuss the achievable limits for them.
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• Array Gain: This refers to the increase in the received signal-to-noise-ratio (SNR) due to the
coherent combining of the signals from different antennas. This combining can be realized
at the receiver or transmitter side through maximal-ratio-combining (MRC)/maximal-ratio-
transmission (MRT), respectively. This combining requires the knowledge of the channel-
state-information (CSI) at the side performing the combining. This enhancement in SNR
provides an increase in coverage of the network.
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Figure 2.1: Diversity gain.
• Diversity Gain: Repetition is one of the effective coding methods that decreases reception
errors. By sending multiple copies of the signal in different (almost independent) spatial
dimensions, at least one of these copies will escape the deep fading situation. This degree
of immunity to fading will provide better reliability for the received signal. The optimal
diversity order will be (d = NT ×NR), if all spatial channels are independent. Diversity gain
can be given as,
d(R) =− lim
ρ→∞
log2 Pe(ρ,R)
log2(ρ)
, (2.1)
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where ρ is the SNR and R is the rate. This translates as a change in the error rate slope, as
shown in figure 2.1.
• Multiplexing Gain: Instead of transmitting the same data stream multiple times, multiple
antennas offer the option of transmitting multiple independent data streams. The maximum
number of independent data streams is limited by the communication channel condition,
namely, the rank of the channel matrix. Ideally, with a full rank channel the number of
independent stream is (r =min(NT ,NR)). Spatial multiplexing helps increasing the capacity
of the network. The multiplexing gain is given as,
r = lim
ρ→∞
Cγout
log2(ρ)
(2.2)
where Cγout is the outage capacity when the outage probability is equal to γ . This reflects as
an increase in the slope of the capacity. Although, diversity and multiplexing help decreasing
error rate and increasing data rate, respectively, it is not possible to achieve both gains at the
same time [13]. This trade-off is represented as,
d(r) = (NR− r)(NT − r), (2.3)
which is illustrated in figure 2.2. This implies that for any increase in the transmission rate,
an increase in the error rate is unavoidable.
• Interference Management: Interference in wireless networks results from multiple users
sharing time and frequency resources. Interference may be mitigated in multiple-input-
multiple-output (MIMO) systems by exploiting the spatial dimension to increase the sep-
aration between users. For instance, in the presence of interference, array gain increases
the tolerance to noise as well as the interference power, hence improving the signal-to-
7
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Figure 2.2: Diversity and multiplexing trade-off.
interference-plus-noise-ratio (SINR). Additionally, the spatial dimension may be leveraged
for the purposes of interference avoidance, i.e., directing signal energy towards the intended
user and minimizing interference to other users. Interference reduction and avoidance im-
prove the coverage and range of a wireless network.
2.1.2 Transceiver Design
As mentioned in the previous section, there are different benefits of MIMO systems, which
some of them can be utilized at the same time, and some cannot coexist. Based on the desired
benefits, a different transceiver design is required. Here, we are discussing some basic algorithms
of MIMO transceivers design.
• Space Time/Frequency Block Codes: Space Block coding are diversity schemes which can
be applied either in time (e.g. Alamouti Scheme [14]), or in Frequency (e.g. LTE precoding).
Taking Alamouti scheme as an example, with the assumption that the channel is invariant
over two symbol periods, the transmitter sends two different symbols from different antennas
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in the first symbol period. Then in the second symbol period, it transmits a conjugate version
of the same two symbols, as shown in figure 2.3. With the proper processing at the receiver
side, Alamouti scheme can achieve a diversity gain of 2NR. Diversity schemes are beneficial
for low rate/high reliability communications.
Figure 2.3: Alamouti scheme.
• Spatial Multiplexing: Differently, spatial multiplexing schemes is aimed to increase trans-
mission data rates. The transmitter can transmit up to NT different streams simultaneously,
under the condition that NR ≥ NT . In order to be able to separate the multiplexed streams, a
special processing is required either at the transmitter or the receiver. The most famous mul-
tiplexing algorithms are zero-forcing (ZF) and generalized-singular-value-decomposition
(GSVD), with both of them require the knowledge of the CSI at the processing side. Al-
though, the maximum possible number of streams to be transmitted is min(NT ,NR), a corre-
lated spatial channel could limit that number to the rank of the channel. Spatial multiplexing
scheme are desired for increasing the data rate while ignoring the communication reliability.
2.2 Spatial Channel Models
Communication channel modeling is an essential process that facilitate the system design
process. Different channel models were proposed based on measurements and empirical fitting.
The selection of the appropriate channel model is necessary, in order to be able to fairly judge
the performance of an algorithm. Here, we discuss the different modeling perspectives regarding
channel models for multiple antenna systems.
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2.2.1 Statistical Models
Statistical channel model is the most widely used model. It treats the channel as a black
box, the channel structure details are not important, only the distribution of the channel coefficients
between each transmitting/receiving antenna pair is needed. This model has the advantage of
simplicity, it can be easily implemented in a linear fashion [15]. The channel is represented as a
matrix H of size NR×NT , where NR is the number of receiving antennas, and NT is the number of
transmitting antennas. Each element of the matrix hi, j represent the small scale fading coefficient
between the ith receiving antenna and the jth transmitting antenna. With the received signal given
as,
y=Hx+w, (2.4)
where x∈CNT×1 is a vector containing the samples to be transmitted from each antenna, y∈CNR×1
is the vector containing the received samples from the different antennas, and w ∈ CNR×1 is the
noise added at each antenna with zero mean and variance σ2w. Figure 2.4 shows an illustration for
the statistical model.
Figure 2.4: MIMO statistical channel model.
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The channel capacity of the MIMO system depends on the knowledge available at the
transmitter side about the communication channel. The capacity in general is given as,
C = max
f (x)
I(x;y) bits/channel use, (2.5)
where I(.) represents the mutual information. In case of CSI knowledge at the transmitter, the
MIMO channel capacity is given by,
C =
R
∑
r=1
log2
(
1+
Pγrλr
NTσ2w
)
, (2.6)
where R is the rank of H, P is the transmitted signal power, λr is the rth unique Eigen value of
H, and γr is the power fraction allocated to the rth Eigen vector. Given that ∑Rr=1 γr = NT , The
optimum solution for γr selection would follow the water-filing algorithm, as shown in figure 2.5,
and the optimum value is given as,
γ∗r =
(
µ− NTσ
2
w
Pλr
)+
, (2.7)
In case of no CSI available at the transmitter side, the capacity is given as,
C = log2
(
det
(
INR +
P
σ2wNT
HHH
))
=
R
∑
r=1
log2
(
1+
Pλr
σ2wNT
)
.
(2.8)
The previously given expressions are for the deterministic channel case. In case of random
channel, the Ergodic capacity averaged over different channel realizations can be used.
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Figure 2.5: Water-filing algorithm.
2.2.2 Physical Models
Contrary to the statistical model, the physical models are concerned about the actual struc-
ture of the channel [16]. The channel here is modeled in the angular domain instead of the spatial
domain. The coefficients of the angular channel matrix can be given as,
hn,m(t) =
L
∑
l=1
βle j(2pi flt+ζl)aR(θn)a∗T (φm)δ (t− τl), (2.9)
where L is the number of paths. βl , fl , τl , and ζl are the gain, Doppler frequency, delay, and
phase of the lth path, respectively. aR and aT are the receive and transmit array steering vectors,
respectively. The steering vectors depend on the geometrical structure of the antenna array. And
the system can be represented as,
y= ARHaAHT x+w. (2.10)
Although, the system is linear in terms of the channel coefficients, it is not linear in terms the
transmit and receive angels θn and φm. An example for physical channel modeling is illustrated in
figure 2.6, this follows the spatial channel model of 3GPP. As seen, the array steering vectors are
a part of the model, which makes this model more suitable for analyzing the beam-forming based
application.
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Figure 2.6: Example of physical modeling “clustered delay line (CDL)”. [17]
2.2.3 Virtual Models
The virtual model takes a path in between the two other models. This model is currently
highly adopted by the mmWave and massive MIMO research [18]. Instead of following the ex-
act physical structure of the channel, The model considers that the channel consists of N virtual
transmitting directions, and M virtual receiving directions, where N and M are the number of array
elements at the transmitter and receiver, respectively. Hence, the channel matrix can be decon-
structed as,
G= ARGvAHT , (2.11)
where AT =
{
α(T )pq
}
N×N
and AR =
{
α(R)pq
}
M×M
are the steering responses of the array at trans-
mitter and receiver, respectively. The matrix entries are given by,
α(T )pq =
1√
N
exp
[
− j2pi
(
p− N−1
2
)
d
λ
cosθ (T )q
]
. (2.12)
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where p,q ∈ [0,1, . . . ,N−1]. The virtual directions here should represent orthogonal spatial basis,
in order for them to reflect independent information about the channel. To insure orthogonality of
these basis the directions θ (T )q should be selected as,
θ (T )q = arccos
[
λ
dN
(
q− N−1
2
)]
, (2.13)
and the same thing applies for AR, where p,q ∈ [0,1, . . . ,M−1]. The selection of such basis will
result in AT and AR exhibiting a DFT matrix structure.
Gv = {gmn}M×N is the virtual channel matrix, which exposes some insights on the phys-
ical structure of the channel. For example, a dense matrix would reflect an environment rich in
scatterers, while a sparse scattered matrix means that the channel has distributed sets of clustered
scatterers. Figure 2.7 represents an illustration for the virtual channel model.
Figure 2.7: Virtual channel modeling.
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2.3 Physical Layer Security
Due to the broadcast nature of the wireless communication channel, the transmitted signals
over such channel are vulnerable to any malicious eavesdropping [19]. In order to secure the
transferred information from such attacks, current standards depend on higher-layers cryptography
algorithms, which are losing there effectiveness due to the increasing computational power of the
current hardware. The retreat of higher-layer secrecy capabilities motivated the work on providing
some security measures in the lower level (i.e. physical-layer).
For a secure communication link to be established, some kind of cooperation is required
between the two legitimate terminals. That cooperation is aimed to put the eavesdropper in a
disadvantage position. Shannon claimed that perfect secrecy can be achieved, if the transmitted
code and the original message are mutually independent. The between the message and the code is
done by using a key, which is shared excursively between the communication nodes. The existence
of the possibility that the key may get exposed to the eavesdropper, makes the idea of perfect
secrecy hard to implement.
Based on Shannon’s information-theoretic point of view [20], Wyner developed the wire-
tap channel model [21], which is considered as the basic structure for most of the physical-layer
security problems. This work was extended to broadcast channels by Csiszar and Korner. In their
work, they considered sending a common message to both receives, while equivocating a confi-
dential message from one of them. Instead of sharing a certain key that can be exposed during the
sharing process, the idea of using the common information about the communication channel was
presented by Hassan. Integrating the channel knowledge into the ciphering process, revived the
idea about perfect secrecy. Many proposals were made regarding the use of the channel, either by
considering the channel information as the seed for the ciphering key [22], or by using the channel
characteristics to conceal the message. The random nature of the physical-layer media promote it
to be a good security tool, with the suitable use of signal processing algorithms. Besides, it doesn’t
require any additional processing in the upper layers.
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Another aspect of secrecy is the authentication process. Before establishing a communica-
tion link, users need to verify the identity of the other node. Two types of attacks can fall under this
category, namely, message falsification and impersonation. Again physical layer algorithm can be
considered a mechanism to fight these attacks. The unique features, of each communication node
in the network and the media between them, represents a good source of authentication process.
Multiple-Antennas (MA) systems offers more resources (i.e. degrees of freedom) to make
use of the channel into secrecy. Some examples of these resources are the number of transmit
antennas and the ability of having a directive communication by using antenna arrays. Using
MA for secrecy purposes is a double-edged weapon, the enhanced transmission quality of the
legitimate users is offset by the increased interception capabilities of the eavesdropper receiver.
as with conventional MA techniques, the availability and accuracy of CSI plays a major role for
regarding the system performance. One of the major techniques that compensate for imperfect
CSI is the artificial noise transmission (i.e., the transmission of a jamming signal along with the
legitimate signal). MA systems also allow the integration of multi-user techniques as means of
secrecy [23,24] (e.g. broadcast MIMO wiretap networks, and MIMO wiretap channel with external
cooperative helper).
Figure 2.8: The wiretap channel model.
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2.3.1 Wiretap Channel
The fundamental model of physical-layer security, called the wiretap channel, was intro-
duced by Wyner [21]. This model represents the joint problem of reliable and secure communica-
tion over noisy channels. As shown in figure 2.8, the target of the transmitter (Alice) is to transmit
a message M through the broadcast channel at a certain rate R. The message M should be correctly
estimated Mˆ by the legitimate user (Bob), while the eavesdropper (Eve) should not obtain any in-
formation about M. Based on the aforementioned model, there exist a code that makes the secrecy
communication rate R achievable, such that
lim
n→∞P(M 6= Mˆ) = 0
lim
n→∞ I(M;Z
n) = 0.
(2.14)
The first condition here represent the reliable communication, while the second insures the secrecy.
The assumptions associated with this model can be stated as,
• There is no existence for a shared key between Alice and Bob.
• The statistics of the channel and the code are known to all parties involved.
• the model assumes that authentication is already in place.
Based on these assumptions, the upper bound of all achievable rates, called secrecy capacity, is
defined as
Cs = max
V→X→Y Z
(I(V ;Y )− I(V ;Z)) . (2.15)
From (2.15), one can interpret that the secrecy capacity is the difference between the reliable
communication rate I(V ;Y ) and the information leaked to the eavesdropper I(V ;Z). This definition
imply the following properties of the secrecy capacity,
• Secrecy capacity is positive, which require advantage between Alice and Bob (channel of
eve is more noisy).
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• Physical secrecy don’t replace computational but help, as an example, we can use physical
properties as means to refresh shared key instead of traditional key management.
Many approaches were proposed to design codes for physical-layer secrecy. two of the
most popular approaches are “channel capacity based codes” and “channel resolvability based
codes.
• Capacity based code:
In this approach the designer choose code-words so that the corresponding uncertainty sets
received by the eavesdropper do not overlap. Based on the wiretap channel model, we
get I(M;Zn) = I(Xn;Zn)−H(M1)+H(M1|MXn). The information leaked about the mes-
sage to Eve I(M;Zn) vanishes if two conditions are met: the randomness compensate the
leaked information about the code-words 1nH(M
1)≈ 1n I(Xn;Zn), and the uncertainty is small
1
nH(M
1|MXn) ≈ 0. This approach is easy to translate to a practical design, through LDPC
and lattice codes.
• Channel resolvability:
For that one, the designer tackle the variational distance secrecy (VDS) metric to induce a
certain distribution for the received uncertainty sets at the eavesdropper. V(pMCn, pM pCn) is
the VDS, which represents the distance between the joint distribution pMCn , of the message
and the code, and the product of their marginal distributions (pM pCn). Here, the overlap-
ping between the uncertainty sets is allowed which turns the problem to a sphere covering
problem, contrary to the sphere packing problem presented in the aforementioned approach.
2.3.2 Secrecy Performance Metrics
Here, we will introduce several of the most frequently used secrecy metrics. Some other
metrics are applicable for certain case studies, but are not widely used.
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• Secrecy Rate:
The transmission rate that can be reliably supported on the main channel, but which is not
decode-able on the interloper channel. the maximum achievable is the secrecy capacity.
For multiple communication terminals case, one is interested in defining secrecy capacity
regions [25].
Rs = 0.5log2(
1+ρb
1+ρe
), (2.16)
where ρb and ρe are the received SNR by Bob and Eve, respectively.
• Secrecy Outage Probability (SOP):
Represents the probability that a certain target secrecy rate γCs is not achieved. SOP char-
acterize the likelihood of simultaneously reliable and secure transmission [26]. employed in
situations where only statistical CSI about the eavesdropper is available.
Pout(Cs) = P(C˜s < γCs), (2.17)
where C˜s is the instantaneous secrecy capacity.
• Secret Diversity/Multiplexing Gain:
Same as conventional MIMO, diversity is the asymptotic rate of decrease with SNR in prob-
ability of error at the desired receiver when subject to secrecy, while multiplexing (DoF) is
the asymptotic rate of increase with SNR in the secrecy rate. the secret Diversity/ Multiplex-
ing trade-off (DMT) capture the interplay between them [27]. DMT value highly depend
on the amount of information available to the legitimate users about the main and wiretap
channels.
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• Secret Key Rate:
It quantifies the rate at which legitimate users can agree upon a shared key sequence by
exchanging messages over public channel [28]. This secret key rate S(X ;Y ||Z) is lower and
upper bounded by,
S(X ;Y ||Z)≤min[I(X ;Y ), I(X ;Y |Z)]
S(X ;Y ||Z)≥max[I(X ;Y )− I(Z;X), I(X ;Y )− I(Z;Y )].
(2.18)
2.3.3 Multiple Antennas for PHY-Sec
MIMO systems are beneficial to use for many typologies and network layouts, and their use
is extended to many applications. A summarizing of the usage of MIMO systems in the secrecy
field is summarized by [29]. As our scope is limited compared to the extended of the MIMO usage
in the secrecy field, we will be focusing on two main categories, namely, point-to-point MIMO and
multi-user MIMO.
2.3.3.1 Point-to-Point
This topology includes a single transmitter (usually referred to as Alice), a single legitimate
receiver (usually referred to as Bob), and an eavesdropper (referred to as Eve). Alice is trying
to pass a confidential message to Bob, with minimizing the probability the Eve would be able
to acquire it. This represent the very basic model that can be extended to various situations or
topology.
• Design:
Beam-former design mainly depends on the knowledge available at Alice about the channels
of both Bob and Eve. Also, this knowledge determine the design target parameter, as men-
tioned in the secrecy metrics section. When perfect global knowledge about the channels
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is present at the transmitter, Alice can use ZF to eliminate the possibility of Eve receiv-
ing any information. The issue with ZF that it sacrifices some of the available degrees-of-
freedom (DOF) in order to insure the secrecy of information. Also, This approach fails when
Eve has a high number of receiving antennas [30].
Another beam-former uses GSVD to exploit the spatial dimensions where Bob has advantage
over Eve. The GSVD creates a set of parallel single-input-single-output (SISO) channels,
Alice then calculate the secrecy rate of each individual channel and transmits only at the
channels where Bob has a positive secrecy rate. This approach achieves high secrecy perfor-
mance, but it has a high computational complexity as well [31]. Other non-linear beamform-
ers can be used to achieve better performance, but they involve a very high computational
complexity.
The main problem with designing the beam-former for secrecy purposes is that the secrecy
objective function (i.e., secrecy capacity/outage probability) usually cause the optimization
problem to become non-convex. The non-convex complexity can be avoided by replacing the
capacity objective function by some other convex functions, or some additional constraints
can be added to generate a sub-optimal beam-former.
Another layer of secrecy, which can be added to some beamformers, is artificial-noise (AN)
[32]. AN is placed to the null-space of the legitimate receiver channel, with a hope that it
would degrade the channel quality of the eavesdropper. Because transmitters usually have a
limited power budget, the available power is divided between the main channel and the AN.
This raises a trade-off between the quality of the main channel, and the secrecy provided by
the added AN.
• Power Allocation:
Just considering increasing the total transmit power will not help enhancing the secrecy
performance. This is because increasing the total power will enhance both the main channel
and the wiretap channel. From this perspective, a careful power assignment to each spatial
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dimension is required [31]. Also, as mentioned before, in case on AN insertion the power
allocation play a significant role on determining the performance. Moreover, with the rise
of green communication concepts, energy efficiency became an important factor in systems
design, which can also be achieved through efficient power allocation.
• Multiple Eavesdroppers:
This situation is considered as a worst case scenario for secrecy systems. Multiple eaves-
dropper cases can be categorized in two approaches. First is the colluding eavesdroppers
case, there eavesdroppers concurrently listen to the legitimate communication and cooper-
atively attempt to decode it. This also is similar to a single eavesdropper with spatially
distributed antennas. In order for Alice to be able to provide secure communications, the
available DOF should be larger than the number of eavesdropper. Due to the physical size
limitation of the system, a secure communication could be inapplicable in such situation.
also eavesdroppers are usually passive, which eliminate the possibility of placing the signal
in the null space of the eavesdroppers, even with the addition of AN.
Second is the non-colluding eavesdroppers. Here, the system performance is limited by the
eavesdropper with the highest quality channel. Therefore, the design focuses on maximizing
the minimum secrecy rate. This will ensure a secure communication link over all the other
eavesdroppers.
2.3.3.2 Multiple Users
One of the multiple antenna system advances is supporting multiple users simultaneously,
as mentioned before. Multiple users systems usually suffer from inter-user-interference. The inter-
ference can degrade the system performance, but also can be used to degrade the performance of
the eavesdropper [33]. Here, we are discussing the design and performance of different multiple
users channels.
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• Broadcast:
This represents the case of a single transmitter (base-station) sending different messages
to multiple users in the down-link. Here two factors need to be considered in the secure
system design, The amount of interference reflected on the legitimate receiver that degrades
its performance, and the amount of data leakage that an eavesdropper would be able to
collect. with appropriate pre-coding, AN is an appropriate way to degrade the eavesdropper
channel quality while stay orthogonal to legitimate users [19]. Although, if CSI is imperfect
at the transmitter, AN could cause degradation to legitimate users too. Another aspect to
be considered for secrecy is users scheduling. Smart scheduling approach could help both
reduce inter-user-interference, and increase secrecy performance.
In Massive MIMO, due to the large number of antennas, high array gain, and fine spatial
resolution, the expected information leakage can be neglected, even if the channel informa-
tion of the eavesdropper is not available. This occurs due to the channel hardening feature of
massive MIMO systems [34]. AN can be used with massive MIMO in order to add another
layer of secrecy assurance.
• Multiple Access:
Here, the multiple legitimate receivers are sending messages simultaneously to the legitimate
receiver (base-station). In order to guarantee secrecy some sort of cooperation is required
between the legitimate transmitters, this could be practically challenging due to the spatial
separation of these transmitters. The area of multiple access secrecy is lightly explored,
and only from the prospective of information theory. in [35], it was proved that the sum
achievable secrecy DOF is K(K−1)K(K−1)+1 , where K is the number of users.
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As mentioned before a good balance between secrecy performance and multi-user interfer-
ence is necessary for multi-user multiple antenna systems. This balance requires a better knowl-
edge of CSI and cooperation between users, which is practically challenging. Investigating dis-
tributed secure systems could help reduce these secrecy requirements, and it also can help in case
of heterogeneous networks.
2.4 Non-Orthogonal Multiple Access
One of the technologies that support the aforementioned views and have drawn a huge at-
tention lately is NOMA. NOMA is known for its superiority in terms of achievable capacity, flexi-
bility, and adaptability towards a massive number of connections when compared to its counterpart
orthogonal multiple access (OMA) [9, 36, 37]. These advancements will enhance the user expe-
rience for eMBB use case [38]. Moreover, the support of grant-free and asynchronous access is
more applicable when NOMA is in use [39]. This will help to reduce the transmitted overhead and
power consumption which will make the requirements for URLLC and mMTC achievable [40].
2.4.1 Power-Based
The majority of NOMA schemes are using power and code domains to multiplex users
into the available resources. Other multiple access schemes like pattern division multiple ac-
cess (PDMA) [41] and spatial division multiple access (SDMA) [42] are also related to NOMA.
Power domain schemes main idea is exploiting the difference in the channel quality of each of the
overlapped users [43]. While assigning a higher transmission power factor to the user with the
weaker channel assure enhancing the received SINR at its end, the good condition of the channel
of the other user allows it to deploy a successive interference cancellation (SIC) strategy that can
help reducing the effect of the interference imposed on its signal [44]. Despite that power domain
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NOMA is capable of supporting asynchronous transmission, it still requires a centralized control
and scheduling. The advantage of NOMA over OMA can be seen in figure 2.9, it is clearly obvious
that the capacity region provided by NOMA is much wider than OMA. This is only true under the
condition of the existence of a decent SNR gap between the users sharing the spectrum.
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Figure 2.9: Capacity region for NOMA and OMA schemes
2.4.1.1 MIMO-OMA
MIMO systems divide the spatial domain into N orthogonal clusters. In order to avoid
inter-cluster interference, the transmitter applies a precoding process based on the channels of the
users assigned to each cluster. In order for the system to maintain the orthogonality while serving a
number of users that is larger than N, the system divides time-frequency resources of each cluster
between users sharing that cluster. If we assume that each cluster serves only 2 users, the sum
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achievable rate can be given as [45],
CMIMO-OMA =
N
∑
n=1
[
αn log2
(
1+
ρ2,n|h2,n|2
αn
)
+(1−αn) log2
(
1+
ρ1,n|h1,n|2
1−αn
)]
.
(2.19)
where ρi,n = Pnσ2i
is the transmit SNR for the ith user in the nth cluster, Pn is the power assigned to
the nth cluster, and σ2i,n is the noise power at the ith user. hi,n represents the effective channel of the
ith user which include both precoding and fading effects, and αn is the fraction of time-frequency
resources allocated for the second user in the nth cluster.
2.4.1.2 MIMO-NOMA
Similar to MIMO-OMA, the space is divided to N orthogonal clusters. Here, the system
supports 2 users per cluster by allocating all the available time-frequency resource to both of them,
while assigning a different transmit power for each of them based on their channel quality [46]. The
system assumes the ability of one user to perform SIC, while the other user treating interference as
additional noise. If we assume that the power fraction allocated to the second user in the nth is ∆n,
then the sum achievable rate can be given as,
CMIMO-NOMA =
N
∑
n=1
[
log2
(
1+(1−∆n)ρ1,n|h1,n|2
)
+ log2
(
1+
∆nρ2,n|h2,n|2
(1−∆n)ρ2,n|h2,n|2+1
)]
.
(2.20)
Here, the first logarithmic term represents the achievable rate of the user applying SIC, while the
second logarithmic term is the achievable rate of the user with the weak channel conditions. The
denominator in the second term represents the interference effect from the other user, which is
treated as noise. With such structure, some excess load is imposed on the scheduler for finding
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the suitable pair of users for each cluster. In order to combine two users under the same spatial
dimension, their channels should be highly correlated. On the other hand, to be able to successfully
employ SIC, the two users should have a decent SNR gap. This pairing process is done to minimize
the interference leakage between clusters, and maximizing the overall gain.
2.4.2 Code-Based
On the other hand, Code domain NOMA spreads the data over the available resources
to ensure high enough SINR for reliable data exchange. Code domain schemes can be catego-
rized into two branches. The first branch is short sequence spreading, which uses short sparse
codes with the deployment of an advanced symbol-level detector at the receiver such as message
passing algorithm (MPA) (e.g. multi-user shared access (MUSA) [47], sparse code multiple ac-
cess (SCMA) [48]). The second branch is long sequence spreading, which uses long codes to
spread the data over all the resources with a deployment of a code-word-level SIC at the receiver
(e.g. non-orthogonal coded access (NOCA) [49]). Both branches of code domain NOMA can
support grant-free transmission. While the short sequences suffer from limited scalability due to
the code length and the necessity of a synchronous transmission, Long sequences have a more
complex receiver structure.
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Chapter 3: Secrecy and Capacity Enhancing with Directional Transmission
In this chapter1, we provide a detailed discussion about the new schemes we provided, in
order to enhance the secrecy and capacity performance multiple antenna systems. These schemes
are based on directional based communication. First, we will present the basic algorithm for Multi-
beam transmission, which act as a baseline for all other techniques. Afterwards, we will focus on
how to enhance the secrecy performance of the system, with different network topologies and
channel conditions. Finally, we will show how to enhance the achievable rate of the system, by
integrating the NOMA concept into directional communication.
3.1 Multiple Directions Transmission
When Directional modulation idea came into realization, the main focus of the research
community was the algorithm efficiency, with the main focus was on a single direction transmis-
sion. Here, we proposed an extension to the directional modulation algorithm towards multiple
directions transmission. With the ability to transmit multiple signals towards different directions
simultaneously, extra degrees of freedom were provided, that can be used to achieve different
goals, namely, reliability, secrecy, and quality.
3.1.1 System Characteristics
Consider a broadcast channel with a single source (base-station) and L destinations, namely
directions. Each direction has its own desired data stream xi(k), and has a different transmission
angle with respect to the base-station θi, where i = 1,2, . . . ,L, and k is the time index. Different
directions share the same resources of time slots, frequency bands, or codes simultaneously. The
base-station uses a linear antenna array, with N elements, for transmission.
1Part of this chapter was published in [50–52]. Permission is included in Appendix A.
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Based on the idea of directional modulation, we need to set W = [w1(k),w2(k), . . . ,wN(k)]T ,
so that f (θi,k) = xi(k), where W is the vector containing the complex weights for the antenna
arrays, and f is the value of the resulting complex antenna pattern at a time instant k by the receiver
located at a certain direction θ ,
f (θ ,k) = h∗(θ)W (k), (3.1)
h∗(θ) = [e− j(
N−1
2 )
2pid
λ cosθ ,e− j(
N−1
2 −1) 2pidλ cosθ ,
. . . ,e j(
N−1
2 )
2pid
λ cosθ ]
(3.2)
and h∗(θ) is the array steering vector for a receiver positioned at the direction θ .
Let us define F as the column vector that contains the desired pattern values, for each of
the desired transmission directions.
F = [ f (θ1,k), f (θ2,k), . . . , f (θL,k)]T
= HHW =

h∗(θ1)
h∗(θ2)
...
h∗(θL)

[w1(k),w2(k), . . . ,wN(k)]
T
(3.3)
where, H ∈ CN×L, and we consider that L≤ N, i.e., the number of desired transmission directions
is less than the number of the antenna array elements. This makes (3.3) an under-determined linear
equation. Using the least-norm solution [53], we will find that
Wln = H
(
HHH
)−1
F (3.4)
By replacing F with X = [x1(k),x2(k), . . . ,xL(k)]T , we can produce the required weights to
modulate the resulting antenna pattern, so that the pattern takes the desired values at the desired
directions. Based on that, the value of the received pattern can be rewritten as,
f (θ ,k) = h∗(θ)H(HHH)−1X(k) (3.5)
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Note that, the usage of any other antenna array structure is applicable, as long as the appro-
priate steering vector h∗(θ) is used for the generation of the weights W . Moreover, if we assume
that the channel state information (CSI) for each of the users is available at the transmitter, we can
enhance the secrecy performance of the system by multiplexing it within the generated weights.
W = AH(AAH)−1X (3.6)
where, A =CHH , and C is the (L×L) diagonal matrix containing the CSI of each of the users.
For the sake of simplification, we take a look into the case, where we need to transmit in
only two directions, we will find that the received signal at any arbitrary direction θs is
f (θs,k) =
1
N2− y212
[(Nys1− ys2y12)x1+(Nys2− ys1y12)x2] (3.7)
where,
ypq = yqp =
N−1
∑
n=0
e j(n−
N−1
2 )
2pid
λ (cosθp−cosθq)
=
sin
(
N pidλ (cosθp− cosθq)
)
sin
(pid
λ (cosθp− cosθq)
) (3.8)
Based on (3.7), we can notice that, for the values of θs ≈ (θ1,θ2), the received value of
f is close to (x1,x2), respectively. Otherwise, the value of f oscillates around zero. Also, we
can consider this as if we create some intended interference using the transmission of the other
directions. The amount of this interference depends on the number of different directions L and
the separation between these directions.
If we try to categorize the scheme based on the definition in [54], the used algorithm can
be considered static for the case of single direction transmission. On the other hand, if we add one
more transmission direction to the system, we will find that the scheme provides similar results
as in the dynamic property. Fig. 3.1 shows the generated magnitude and phase of the transmitted
pattern using QPSK signal structure.
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Figure 3.1: Transmitted pattern in case of two directions transmission. The upper section shows
the magnitude of the received antenna pattern for each spatial direction, single intended direction
transmission (red), two directions transmission (blue), users are located at 50o and 80o. The
Lower section shows the phase of the received pattern with the same setup.
The system here transmits only the symbol e j
pi
4 for the user located at 50o, while trans-
mitting a random symbol for the other user located at 80o. We can see that in the case of single
direction transmission (red curves), the magnitude and the phase of the resulting antenna pattern
have a static value for all directions while, in the case of two directions (blue curves), the magni-
tude and the phase take multiple values depending on the transmitted symbol to the other direction.
By increasing the number of directions to four (50o, 80o, 110o, 140o), we can recognize from Fig.
3.2 that the phase is becoming more random and may be considered as uniformly distributed on the
values between −pi and pi . Increasing the number of possible combinations of interfering symbols
by using higher order modulation schemes, i.e., 16-QAM, 64-QAM, will definitely increase the
randomization of the received signal outside the desired transmission beams.
31
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180
−200
−150
−100
−50
0
50
100
150
200
Transmission Direction
Ph
as
e
Figure 3.2: Phase Pattern in case of four directions transmission. The phase of the received
antenna pattern at each spatial direction, the transmission is intended for 4 different directions,
users are located at 50o, 80o, 110o, and 140o.
3.1.2 Reception Error Rate
Now, we will discuss the effect of this system structure on the error at the user-end. For
BER evaluation, we use euclidean distance detectors for QAM, and a half-wavelength linear an-
tenna array, with eight antenna elements (i.e. N = 8). The transmission is directed to 50o, 80o,
110o, and 140o, with an independent data stream for each of them. Fig. 3.3 and 3.4 show the error
graphs for the reception obtained from 80o direction, and the same apply for the other directions.
We can rewrite (6) as
f (θs) = [a1(θs),a2(θs), . . . ,aL(θs)]

x1
x2
...
xL

(3.9)
Based on that, we can define the signal-to-interference-plus noise- ratio (SINR) for the data
stream i received at the direction θs as
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Figure 3.3: BER VS. transmission direction. Comparing the mathematical and simulated results
of the BER of decoding the data directed towards 80o. Here, we do not include the effect of the
noise, so the figure shows only the effect of the interference created by the signals transmitted to
other directions.
ρi(θs) =
|ai(θs)|2
∑∀ j 6=i |a j(θs)|2+Nθs
(3.10)
where j ∈ {1,2, . . . ,L}.
Hence, the BER for a Gray-coded M-QAM modulation scheme (without channel coding)
is approximated by:
BERQAM(θs)≈
√
M−1
log2(M)−1
(
log2(M)√
M
)
Q
(√
3ρi(θs)
M−1
)
(3.11)
where Q(.) represents the Q-function, and M is the modulation order. In general, the lower bound
of BER(θs) for any system can be calculated by substituting the value of the SINR by ρi(θs). This
acts as a lower bound because it only considers the effect of the interference created by the signals
of other users, and it does not include the distortion embedded to the signal by the DM algorithm.
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In Fig. 3.3, we show the illustration of (11) in case of a 16-QAM transmitted signal. The
result is compared to the one from the system simulation. Fig.3.4 shows the BER for different order
QAM modulation schemes. It’s obvious that when the modulation order increases, even though
the effect of noise is neglected, the probability of error increases as we go far from the intended
direction. This is noticeable through the change of the width of the main beam around 80o.
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Figure 3.4: BER for different modulation orders. The BER of decoding the data directed towards
80o, while using different modulation orders for the transmitted data.
In Fig. 3.5, we calculate the secrecy capacity based on effective SINR from (10), where the
SNR for the desired direction at 80o is 10 dB. Again, the figure shows high secrecy gain outside
the main lobe, which indicates that the data obtained from non-intended directions will not be
detected reliably. The figure also shows that the communication is not secure in the direction of
the legitimate user, however, the multi-path nature of the channel can be used to generate a pre-
coding scheme that insure secrecy for that direction. The precoder generation is out of the scope
of this work.
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Figure 3.5: Secrecy rate vs. direction of transmission. the secrecy capacity calculated based on
the SINR of the received symbols.
The secrecy capacity CSecrecy, and capacities of the channels are obtained from
CSecrecy =C(θd)−C(θ) (3.12)
C(θ) = log2(1+ρi(θ)), (3.13)
where C(θd) is the capacity at the desired direction θd .
What we noticed from the previous discussions is that, with the increasing number of the
possible values of the transmitted signal, the randomness of the received signal outside of the
interest beam increases. Also, the width of the correct reception beam decreases. Considering
the extreme situation where the signal has the same structure as the noise, i.e., a Gaussian signal,
orthogonal-frequency-division-multiplexing (OFDM) as an example, we can highly reduce the
probability of detection outside of the main interest beam. Besides, the usage of an OFDM signal
will facilitate the estimation and equalization of the effects of fading channels. For the OFDM
system we used the Extended Pedestrian A (EPA) propagation model from the LTE standard [55],
and the first OFDM symbol of each transmitted block is allocated for pilot signals to be used
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for channel estimation. It’s assumed that the pilot signals are known for all the receivers in the
system. Fig. 3.6 shows the BER for all the transmitted data streams with the direction of the
transmission. We can see that each stream can be delivered correctly to a pre-specified direction,
while it is observed as noise-like signal in other directions. The figure also shows the advantage
of including the CSI as mentioned in (3.4). We can notice that having CSI as a part of the signal
generation reduces the width of the detection beam (dashed curves). Here, CSI adds another source
of randomization for the signal transmitted to the undesired directions.
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Figure 3.6: Channel knowledge effect on BER. Each of these curves represents the resultant BER
at each direction, based on decoding each one of the transmitted streams. There are 4 different
data streams directed to 50o, 75o, 100o, and 125o
As we expect to have large dimensions for H, and due to the high complexity of the matrix
inversion operation, we suggest to employ least-mean-squares (LMS) adaptive filtering algorithm
[56] to synthesize this system with low complexity. The algorithm is shown in Algorithm 1, and
the value of the convergence factor µ is determined based on the construction of H. One of the
main concerns about LMS is the convergence rate, which would affect the pattern generation rate,
and the transmission rate. There are many other different techniques that can be used to generate
the pattern, each of them has its own complexity and rate parameters (e.g., Recursive least squares
(RLS), QR Decomposition, etc.) [56].
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Algorithm 1 Complex LMS algorithm
1: W (0) =zeros(N,1)
2: while c≥ 0:
3: E = XH−W (c)HH
4: W (c+1) =W (c)+µHEH
3.1.3 Flexible Beam-Width
As mentioned previously, the ULA response acts as an inverse DFT-process that performs
a transformation from the spatial-location domain to the spatial-angular domain. Hereby, we sug-
gest that it is possible to control the spatial-angular domain by integrating a DFT-process in the
generation of the array weights. Figure 3.7 shows the block diagram for the proposed generation
process of the array weights. This structure imitates an OFDM system structure but with both the
DFT and its inverse located at the transmitter, with the sub-beams here resembling the sub-carriers
in the OFDM case.
DFT 
Precoding
. . .
. . .
. . .
Beam 
Mapping
Antenna 
Response
x1
x2
x3
x4
x5
The antenna array response 

at certain pre-selected directions 

resembles the inverse DFT process
θ1, θ2, θ3, θ4, θ5
ϕ1,ϕ2,ϕ3,ϕ4,ϕ5
xN (k)
x(k)
(AHT )
(AT )
ϕ2
ϕ1
ϕ5
ϕ4
ϕ3
r(θ3, k)
r(θ4, k)
r(θ1, k)
r(θ5, k)
r(θ2, k)
Figure 3.7: DFT-based directional modulation block diagram.
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Then, the array weights can be generated using,
w(k) = ATxN(k), (3.14)
where xN(k) is a N× 1 vector containing the data to be transmitted xn(k) mapped to their corre-
sponding sub-beams (angles) indexes. The system structure in (3.14) has several benefits,
• The generation matrix AT is a fixed matrix, which makes it independent of the desired
transmission directions θi. This independence will simplify the adaptation process in case
of change in one of these transmission. Only the sub-beam assignment2 will need to be
changed.
• The generation matrix has a DFT structure, which makes the weights generation process
less complex and more computationally efficient by implementing it using FFT-algorithm,
compared to the previously suggested zero-forcing scheme.
• With the availability of large size arrays, this structure gives the flexibility in controlling the
total beam-width assigned for each transmitted stream. If one stream requires a large beam-
width3 , assigning a set of sub-beams to the same stream would serve as a single large beam
that satisfies the required width.
Moreover, directional modulation structure provides a secure communication path for each
of the data streams. The signal delivered to any receiver will take the form,
r(k) =Gw(k)+ z(k) = ARGvxN(k)+ z(k), (3.15)
where z is a complex additive white Gaussian Noise.
2The sub-beams assignment is included in the vector xN(k), where the vector x(k) is mapped to the desired direc-
tions, and the other elements of xN(k) are equal to zero.
3This can occur if there is a larger area of coverage requirement or the receiver is suffering from a blockage
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Based on the adopted model of single antenna receiver and single path channel, AR = 1,
and Gv = {gn}1×N . If we consider a subset of the transmission directions, N ⊂ {θn}, composed
of all the sub-beams affecting the intended receiver, then,
|gn|= 0 ∀n /∈N . (3.16)
We define another subset of sub-beams, P ⊂ {θn = θp}, composed of all directions (sub-beams)
which contain the transmitted information xp(k), p ∈ [1,2, . . . ,P]. Therefore,
r(k) = z(k) ∀n /∈ (N ∩P). (3.17)
Equation (3.17) refers to the case where the receiver is aligned to any of the virtual directions that
are not utilized (i.e., xn=0). In such case there is no information transmitted towards the location
of that receiver. The secrecy concerns rise in two situations,
3.1.3.1 The Eavesdropper is Aligned to the Information Beam
In such case, several methods can be applied. One way would be exploiting the multi-path
environment. The extension of the proposed scheme to multi-path channels can be straightforward
similar to the suggestions in [51]. Also, a cooperative scenario can be beneficial [57].
3.1.3.2 The Eavesdropper is Out of the Information Beam
Contrary to (3.17), the eavesdropper receives a mixture of all transmitted streams. Here,
we can make use of the similarity between the proposed scheme and OFDM structure by applying
some OFDM based secrecy method (e.g. reducing the out-of-band transmission). Alternatively,
the insertion of artificial noise into the non-utilized sub-beams (nulled virtual directions) would
be effective, but it needs careful management in case of multi-path environment to avoid self-
interference.
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Figure 3.8: DFT-based transmission pattern. The transmitted power pattern with three different
desired directions, and different beam-width requirements.
Such case can be represented by a mismatch between the generation matrix AT , and the
transmission steering matrix A˜T , and the received signal will be,
r(k) =GvA˜HT ATxN(k)+ z(k). (3.18)
This resembles the case of OFDM transmission with inter-carrier-interference due to sampling
offset. Using [58, Eq. 22], we can define the average received power of the desired symbol at a
certain direction, normalized to the symbol power, as
η(θ) =
sin2{piβ (θ)Ns}
N2s sin
2{piβ (θ)} (3.19)
where β (θ) = ∆θ/pi , and ∆θ = |θd − θ | is the difference between the direction of the desired
symbol and the direction of the eavesdropper.
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Hence the received SINR at the eavesdropper for the symbol xp would be
γ(θ) =
ηp(θ)
∑i 6=pηi(θ)+σ2z
. (3.20)
Figure 3.8 shows the transmitted power pattern. We can see the flexibility provided by the proposed
scheme in terms of using variable sub-beam assignment to achieve beam-width change.
3.2 Location-Based Secrecy
A directional-based secrecy was discussed in the previous section, with different implemen-
tation strategies, considering flexibility and complexity. Although, the proposed scheme provides a
secure communication link towards the desired direction, an eavesdropper located along the same
direction would cause a huge secrecy threat. In this section, we will further enhance the proposed
scheme, in order to avoid the man-in-the-middle issue.
3.2.1 Topologies
3.2.1.1 Single Transmitter
Consider a single base station equipped with an N elements linear antenna array. The base
station is serving M legitimate users; each is equipped with a single antenna. We assume the
existence of a passive eavesdropper, which is equipped with an arbitrary number of antennas NE .
The signals transmitted by the M users are received through L different paths. Here, we
assume space reciprocity, i.e., the signal transmitted by the base station is also received by the
users through the same L paths. Note that; L is the maximum number of independent paths in the
system 4.
4In a practical system, some of the users may experience less diverse channel. For these situations, the gain
coefficients corresponding to the non-utilized paths by a user will be considered as zeros.
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Figure 3.9: Single transmitter topology. A system illustration with 3 legitimate users (Blue) and
one eavesdropper (Red). Legitimate users receive signals from 2 paths (Solid colored lines), and
the eavesdropper receive it through 3 paths (Red dashed lines).
Let us define αml as the gain coefficient of the lth path that is delivered to the mth user. We
assume that all αml’s are available at the base station through feedback from all users. Each path is
delivered with θl angle-of-departure (AoD), these AoD’s are evaluated at the base station, which
can be done using one of the methods according to [59].
The eavesdropper receives signals through P paths, we also define βp as the gain coef-
ficient of the pth path to eavesdropper. We assume that all βp’s and αml’s are also available at
the eavesdropper. This is considered as worst-case scenario where the eavesdropper has acquired
the information about the channel state information (CSI) of the legitimate link through feedback
channels. Fig. 3.9 shows an example illustration for such system.
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Here, we are considering random small scale fading effect, which is modeled as a Rayleigh
fading. Then, the gains are modeled as i.i.d Gaussian random variables. The effect of the large
scale fading (Path-loss and Shadowing) is not considered. This assumption is based on considering
a noiseless channel for the eavesdropper. In such situation, for a certain eavesdropper location, the
average path-loss affecting both the desired signal and interfering signals will almost have the
same value, which means that the path-loss will not affect the value of the received signal-to-
interference-ratio (SIR).
3.2.1.2 Coordinated Multi-Point Transmission
CoMP refers to a wide range of techniques that enable dynamic coordination or transmis-
sion with multiple geographically separated base stations to enhance the end-user service quality
even at cell edges [60, 61]. One of the major categories for CoMP downlink transmission is the
joint processing and transmission scheme where data is transmitted simultaneously from all base
stations to improve the received signal quality or to cancel interference from other users. To that
end, highly detailed feedback is required on the channel properties in a fast manner. Another
requirement is the need for very close coordination between the base stations to facilitate com-
bination of data as well as fast switching of the cells. Figure 3.10 shows the structure of CoMP
network.
Here, we assume the lack of knowledge of CSI of all users at all base stations. Each base
station only knows the relative direction of each desired user to its location. Moreover, the strict
timing coordination can be relaxed since we are sending the same data from all base stations.
Hence the delayed signals can be considered equivalent to multi-path components.
Considering a single user system, the received signal at the desired location will be,
rd(t) =
B
∑
i=1
gi(t− τi)sConf(t)+ z(t), (3.21)
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Figure 3.10: Cooperative radio access network.
where B is the number of base-stations, gi is the complex channel gain coefficient associated with
the transmission of the ith base-station, and τi is the corresponding delay. sCon f (t) is the con-
fidential message intended for the legitimate user, and z(t) is the additive Gaussian noise at the
receiver.
On the other hand, at any other location the B signals will not be the same due to the
directional modulation selectivity which inherently causes interference to all directions outside the
information beams,
rd(t) =
B
∑
i=1
gi(t− τi)h†(θi)w(t)+ z(t). (3.22)
Including the knowledge of CSI in the synthesis process of w(t) at the transmitter would
further improve the secrecy performance as shown in previous sections. Allowing the base stations
to divide the data into different components each transmitted from a different base station and
taking into account pre-compensation of channel effects, the data can be distributed in such a way
44
that the signals can be coherently added at the user’s locations to compose the intended data. This
division pattern is not unique and does not need to be known at the receiver. Hence, it can be
changed continuously to further secure the transmission (i.e., the synthesis process of w(t) can be
changed from one transmission block to another).
3.2.1.3 Vulnerable Region Evaluation
To quantify the location-specific security achieved against eavesdropping in the wireless
system, we define a new security metric called the vulnerable region. For a network with M users,
VR is defined as the average of the Vulnerable regions of all users in the network
V R =
1
M
M
∑
i=1
V Ri (3.23)
where the vulnerable region of the ith user V Ri is the region in which a receiver can decode the
data of the ith user. To test our scheme, we generate the location of users randomly within a 2-D
grid served by B base stations. The number of users that can be served simultaneously, M, depends
on the number of antenna array elements N. We consider the full capacity of the system by letting
the number of users equal to the number of antenna array elements (i.e., N = M). We divide the
area of the network into K square points. Hence, the number of squares in which the information
of legitimate users is accessible normalized to the total points of the network gives the vulnerable
region metric. We consider the signal at a location to be decodable when the bit error rate (BER)
reaches a certain threshold η .
V Ri =
1
K
K
∑
k=1
U (η−BERk) (3.24)
where U(.) is the unit step function. The threshold η and the ratio between k and the total area of
the covered grid can be chosen based on the secrecy requirement of the system.
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3.2.2 Signal Structure
We define matrices A= {αml}M×L and H= {h(θl)}1×L. With the availability of A and H
at the base station, the transmitted antenna pattern can be synthesized as
f (θ ,k) = h†(θ)H[H†H]−1A†[AA†]−1x(k) = h†(θ)Dx(k), (3.25)
where x ∈ CM×1 vector that contain the users data. Then, the SINR for the mth transmitted signal
xm(k) at any arbitrary direction θ can be calculated using (3.10), with D=H[H†H]−1A†[AA†]−1.
We can see from (3.25), that the transmitted pattern at any direction θ is a linear combi-
nation of all M data streams. Then, if an eavesdropper is trying to decode the mth message based
on the reception of a single direction, it will suffer from a high interference level due to the other
M−1 streams. We will show later that the received SIR value has a high probability of being low.
3.2.2.1 Eavesdropper with a Single Antenna
Based on this model, the received signal at any receiver in the network is given as
r(k) = eH˜†Dx(k) = v×x(k), (3.26)
where e = {εq}1×Q, εq is the complex gain of the qth received path, and Q is the total number of
received paths. H˜= {h(θq)}1×Q is the steering matrix corresponding to the transmission directions
θq with q ∈ {1,2, . . . ,Q}.
Then, considering the decoding of the mth message, the received SINR can be calculated
as
γm =
|vm|2σ2m
∑ j 6=m |v j|2σ2j +σ2nm
, (3.27)
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where v j is the jth element of v which represent coefficient affecting the data of the jth user. For
the mth legitimate user {e≡ am,H˜≡H}, where am is the mth row of A representing the channel of
the mth user. This will result in,
v= amH†D,
= amH†H[H†H]−1A†[AA†]−1,
= amA†[AA†]−1,
(3.28)
This leaves us with,
vm = 1,
v j 6=m = 0,
γmLegit = σ
2
m/σ
2
nm .
(3.29)
Otherwise, if there is a mismatch between the channel used at the transmitter and the actual
channel, the legitimate receiver will experience some multi-user interference. The effect of multi-
user interference on the secrecy performance will be discussed in subsection E.
In the case of an eavesdropper {e≡ b,v= bH˜†D}, where b= {βp}1×P. The received SINR
for that case would be,
γmEaves =
|bH˜†dm|2σ2m
|bH˜†Dm|2σ2int +σ2ne
(3.30)
where dm is the mth column of D, representing the precoding vector for the mth data stream. Dm
is the rest of the precoding matrix D after removing dm. σ2int is the transmission power associated
with the M−1 interfering streams, and σ2ne is the noise power at the eavesdropper side.
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In order to consider the minimum guaranteed secrecy, we assume that the eavesdropper has
a noiseless channel (i.e., σ2e = 0)5. Then, the achievable secrecy rate can be defined as,
Rm = Rl−Re,
=
[
log2(1+ γ
m
Legit)− log2(1+ γmEaves)
]+
.
(3.31)
The performance of the system in term of average achievable secrecy rate and secrecy outage
probability will be investigated in the next section. Consider theorem 1 for the distribution of γmLegit
and Re.
Theorem 1. The achievable rate at the eavesdropper follows a Logistic distribution,
Logistic(log( Pσ2int
), 1M ), hence, the received SINR follows a Shifted-Log-Logistic distribution.
Proof. Starting from (3.28), with the assumption of i.i.d. elements of A and the large number of
antenna elements N, it is valid to assume that the elements of the resulting vector v are complex
Gaussian random variables according to the central limit theorem (v j ∼ CN(0,1)).
For the proposed system to serve K users, at least (N > K) antenna elements are needed.
The number of involved users K, not the number of antennas N, is the main determinant for the
performance of the system. The assumption of a large number of antennas is made in order to
assure that the system is able to serve a large enough number of users. With larger number of
users involved, the central limit theorem assumption is justified. On the other hand, when a limited
number of users is present, we can see that there is a mismatch between the simulation and theo-
retical results, which appears in Figure 3.14. This would make the squared magnitude follows an
exponential distribution (|v j|2 ∼ Exp(λ )), with the shape parameter λ = 1.
Considering the worst case where the eavesdropper channel is noiseless (σ2ne = 0), we can
rewrite (3.30) as,
γmEaves =
|bH˜†dm|2σ2m
|bH˜†Dm|2σ2int
(3.32)
5The assumption of noiseless eavesdropper channel corresponds to calculating a lower bound on performance.
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Letting X = |bH˜†dm|2, Y = |bH˜†Dm|2, and Z = X +Y , the eavesdropper achievable rate
would be,
Re = log(1+
Xσ2m
Yσ2int
)
= log(
ZP
Yσ2int
)
= log(
P
σ2int
)− log(Y
Z
)
(3.33)
with Y and Z following the exponential distribution Exp(1). Then, the received SINR will take the
form,
γmEaves =
σ2int e(Re−µ)
P
−1. (3.34)
The formula in (3.33) resembles a random variable with a Logistic distribution, Logistic(µ,β ).
where µ = log( Pσ2int
) is the location parameter, and β = 1/M is the scale parameter,
FRe(r) = 0.5
[
1+ tanh
(
r−µ
2β
)]
, (3.35)
Moreover, The received SINR γmEaves would follow the Shifted-Log-Logistic distribution
with parameters α = eµ −1, σ = Me−µ , and ε = µ . Then, the CDF of the SINR is given as,
FγmEaves(γ) =
1
1+
(
1+ ε(γ−α)σ
)− 1ε . (3.36)
Hence, the secrecy outage probability can be calculated as,
P(Rm ≤ γth) = P [(Rl− γth)≤ Re]
= 1−FRe(Rl− γth).
(3.37)
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Here, the eavesdropper is considered entirely passive, and the information about its channel
is not available to any of the legitimate users. As part of the performance evaluation, it will be
compared to the performance of MIMO precoding with AN, while considering the optimal power
distribution between data and AN [62].
3.2.2.2 Eavesdropper with an Arbitrary Number of Antennas
The case of an eavesdropper with multiple receiving antennas can be thought of as equiva-
lent to a network with multiple eavesdroppers. It represents the worst-case scenario of the multiple-
eavesdroppers case, where all the eavesdroppers have perfect cooperation channel. On the other
hand, it must be noted that the scenarios studied in the sequel do not consider the cases of active
eavesdroppers.
Considering the AN system, and due to the aforementioned assumption of the availabil-
ity of A at the eavesdropper, the eavesdropper can reconstruct the pre-coding matrix on its side.
For the case where {NE < NA}, the eavesdropper will not be able to separate the legitimate data
from the noise components. When {NE ≥ NA} and assuming knowledge of the pre-coding matrix,
the eavesdropper has enough information to be able to extract the legitimate data from the noise
imposed over it [63]. Here, NA represents the number of antennas at the transmitter of the AN
scheme, which corresponds to M in our proposed scheme.
Redefine the received signal at the eavesdropper as,
re(k) = BH˜†Ds(k), (3.38)
where B = {βnp}NE×P and βnp represents the gain coefficient of the pth path received by the nth
antenna.
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For the AN case, the pre-coding matrix D is constructed using only statistical information
of the channel. This information is fed back to the transmitter, which makes it vulnerable to the
eavesdropper. In such case, as stated earlier, the eavesdropper can reconstruct D and acquire the
transmitted data if it has enough receiving antennas.
For the proposed scheme, and based on equation (3.38), the transmission directions, em-
bedded in H, goes into the construction of the precoding matrix D. H is assumed to be exclusively
known at the base station6. Due to the lack of knowledge of H at the eavesdropper side, it will
not be able to perfectly reconstruct D and extract the legitimate data, even for the case where
{NE ≥ M}. Later, we will also show that the random generation of H will not be beneficial, in
order to correctly extract the legitimate data.
3.2.2.3 Multiple Access Secrecy Rate
Another concern, for the multiple access systems, is the secrecy sum-rate. The secrecy
sum-rate is calculated based on the amount of data leaked from one user to the other users in the
system. The achievable secrecy sum-rate is obtained by considering the worst-case scenario, where
for each legitimate user m the remaining M− 1 users are considered as collaborative eavesdrop-
pers [64]. This case is equivalent to a multi-input, single-output, multi-eavesdropper (MISOME)
wiretap channel [30]. The achievable secrecy sum-rate Rsum is given by,
Rsum =
M
∑
m=1
[log2(1+ γm)− log2(1+ γmˆ)]+ (3.39)
by replacing b with am in equation (14) and based on [64], we can define,
γm =
|amH†dm|2
∑ j 6=m |amH†d j|2+σ2nm
, (3.40)
γmˆ = ||AmH†dm||2 (3.41)
6The estimation process of the directions used for transmission and the generation of the steering vectors are
exclusively done at the base-station. This information is not shared at any point during the communication process.
This makes it not possible for the eavesdropper to acquire such information.
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where Am is the rest of A after removing am, and d j is the part of the pre-coder related to
the jth user data.
Basically, γm represents the power of the mth legitimate message at the mth user compared
to the interference imposed on it from the rest M−1 messages. While γmˆ represents the leakage of
the mth message received by the remaining M−1 users.
In the proposed system, the pre-coder zero-forces the M legitimate messages with respect
to each other. This means that in the event of perfect knowledge of the users CSI’s, the sum rate
would be infinite. For more realistic assumption, in the next section, we will consider the case of
imperfect CSI knowledge and study its effect on the achievable secrecy sum-rate.
3.2.2.4 Power Allocation
The work in this paper focuses on studying performance evaluation and simulation under
equal power allocation, where all transmitted streams are allocated the same power. While this
strategy might not result in the optimal system performance, it enables simplicity in terms of
practical system implementation as well as tractability in terms of mathematical analysis. The
results obtained here can be thought of as a lower bound on the optimal system performance.
The system can be further extended to incorporate different power allocations for differ-
ent directions which will require further studies into different power allocation strategies as well
which is left as a future expansion of this work. Here, we are discussing some of the other appli-
cable power allocation strategies. Since the secrecy aspects are the main drive for this work, the
focus should be on utility functions such as secrecy rate and secrecy outage probability. Then, the
optimization problems can be formulated as follows,
{σ21 ,σ22 , . . . ,σ2M}= arg max
σ21 ,σ
2
2 ,...,σ
2
M
Rsum
{σ21 ,σ22 , . . . ,σ2M}= arg max
σ21 ,σ
2
2 ,...,σ
2
M
R¯s
{σ21 ,σ22 , . . . ,σ2M}= arg min
σ21 ,σ
2
2 ,...,σ
2
M
P(R¯s < γth)
(3.42)
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where R¯s = 1M ∑
M
i=1 Ri is the average achievable secrecy rate per user. Besides, based on the desired
application, various constrains can be imposed on the system. Exemplary constraints may include,
but not limited to, total power (∑Mm=1σ2m ≤P), average power, average received SINR per user, or
enhancing the overall fairness between users.
3.2.3 “Secret-Sharing” Based Enhanced Secrecy
In order to further enhance the secrecy performance of the system, a cryptography based
approach can be incorporated in the proposed signal structure. First we will provide a overview
of the cryptography approach called secret sharing. Then, the approach of applying it to the
current signal structure will be discussed. The enhanced performance will be presented in the next
subsection with the rest of the performance results.
3.2.3.1 Secret Sharing
In [65,66], Blakley and Shamir respectively introduced a secure algorithm to share a secret
message. The scheme we are adopting is the (B,L)-threshold scheme, where (B≤ L), and B,L are
positive integers. A secretX can only be retrieved if at least B participants out of the available L
were able to collaborate with their respective shares.
This scheme is recently introduced as a mean to securely transfer visual and acoustical
content [67,68]. The dealerD , which has the knowledge about the secret messageX , selects (B−
1) random elements denoted a= [a0,a1, . . . ,a(B−1)]T , while a0 =X . D uses a as the coefficients
to generate a polynomial of the order B Then, D computes the L shares, which are the values of
the generated polynomial, as,
yi =
B−1
∑
j=0
a jv
j
i mod p ∀i ∈ {1,2, . . . ,L} (3.43)
where each vi is a point on the polynomial and randomly selected, and p > L is a prime to ensure
that all operations are performed in a finite field.
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If the participants are able to combine at least B shares, the secretX can be retrieved using
one of the following approaches,
• Solving a system of linear equations:
a= V−1y, (3.44)
where y= [y1,y2, . . . ,yB]T and V= {v ji }B×B is a Vandermonde matrix and its determinant is given
as,
detV= ∏
1≤i< j≤B
(vi− v j) mod p. (3.45)
As all v’s are distinct, there are no zero terms in the product, and hence, detV 6= 0. Therefore, the
system has a unique solution.
• Using Lagrange interpolation:
X =
B
∑
i=1
yi · ci, (3.46)
where
ci =
B
∏
j=1
j 6=i
v j
vi− v j . (3.47)
The value of ci,∀i ∈ [l] can be pre-computed, and considered publicly accessable.
For the case of (B = L), the secret retrieval can be reduced to,
X =
B
∑
i=1
yi. (3.48)
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3.2.3.2 Signal Construction
The proposed algorithm requires a number of sources B, each of these sources transmits
one of the possible y(i)m shares, which are generated based on the secret message of the mth user.
The sources then directionally modulate these shares to the predefined location of the mth user xm.
Once the signals from all sources are added together at the location of the mth user, the receiver can
correctly decode the secret message. In such case, an eavesdropper that is geographically located
in a different place, other than the legitimate receiver, cannot successfully decode the message as
it is unable to collect all the fragments of the secret.
Although the proposed algorithms is applicable for different system structures, we adopt the
CoMP based structure [60] as a way to prove the concept. Some other possible system structures
that would benefit from such algorithms are, a single base-station in a multi-tap environment,
where the signal can reach the user through different communication paths each of them carrying
a different fragment of the secret. Another system would be a relay based network, where we can
solve the untrusted relay problem by limiting the availability of information at the relays to only
the non-reconstructable fragments.
The adopted system consists of B transmission points (TP), and each TP is equipped with a
ULA of length N. The system serves M users, each user is equipped with a single omni-directional
antenna. We assume that all eavesdroppers in the system are passive, which makes the system
unaware of their CSI. The received signal at any location is given by,
r(k) =
B
∑
i=1
g(i)(k− τi)s(i)(θ ,k)+ z(k),
=
B
∑
i=1
g(i)(k− τi)hH(θ (i))w(i)(k)+ z(k).
(3.49)
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where g(i) is the channel gain coefficient associated with the transmission of the ith base-station,
and τi is the corresponding delay. s(i) is the transmitted signal, and z(t) is the additive Gaussian
noise at the receiver. For simplicity, we assume full synchronization, where the signals of all TPs
arrive at the appropriate time at the desired location (i.e., τi = τ ∀i).
Then, the weights vector of the ith TP is given as,
w(i)(k) =H
(
HHH
)−1 y(i)(k), (3.50)
where y(i)(k) =
[
y(i)1 (k),y
(i)
2 (k), . . . ,y
(i)
M (k)
]T
are the shares of the M legitimate users, given to the
ith TP. We assume that each TP has a power constraint of Pi, then
(
∑Mm=1αm ≤ ∑Bi=1 Pi
)
.
With such a structure of weights, the signal received at the location of any of the M users
can be described as,
rm(k) =
B
∑
i=1
g(i)(k)hH(θ (i))H
(
HHH
)−1 y(i)(k)+ z(k),
=
B
∑
i=1
g(i)(k)y(i)m (k)+ z(k) = xm(k)+ z(k).
(3.51)
For any other location, the receiver won’t be able to retrieve the message due to the following,
• Directional Modulation effect: where all the information outside the main beam is random-
ized.
• Secret sharing effect: even if the eavesdropper is in line with the main beam of one of the
BSs, it will not be able to collect the other pieces of the secret unless it is co-located with the
legitimate user.
Moreover as the polynomial coefficients a are selected randomly, there is no fixed pattern,
for the transferred secrets, that the eavesdropper is able to trace (i.e., the system is dynamic).
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3.2.3.3 Secrecy Analysis
For simplicity we will adopt an (B,B)-threshold algorithm, so that the secret is directly
recovered by adding all the shares, which is also suitable for wireless environment as the signals
are directly superimposed over the air.
Construction 1. For any set of secretsX ∈CM, the encoder/decoder pair can be represented as,
Enc(xm) = y
(i)
m =
(
xm
B
+ai− 1B−1∑j 6=i
a j
)
∀i∈[B]
,
Dec(ym) =
B
∑
i=1
g(i)y(i)m = xm,
(3.52)
where ai is an arbitrary complex number chosen based on the Gaussian distributionN (0,1).
It was proven in [69] that, for any subset of shares yˆm where |yˆm|< B, a scheme following
Construction 1 is δB-secure, where,
δB = I [Sm(k); yˆm(k)]≤ 2(B−1)B . (3.53)
Based on the data-processing inequality [70], this result acts as the upper limit on the information
transferred to the eavesdropper, which is not able to collect all the shares,(i.e., I[Sm(k);r(k)] ≤
I[Sm(k); yˆm(k)]). This is the typical situation for the suggested system, where the eavesdropper
will not be able to retrieve all the shares unless it is physically co-located with the legitimate user.
An extreme case where the eavesdropper is able to collect all the shares would be if there is a single
legitimate user and B cooperative eavesdroppers. We are proposing a modified scheme to avoid
such situation in the next section.
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Considering the worst case scenario, where the eavesdropper has a noiseless system, and
does not receive interference from the shares of the other M− 1 users. Then the lower bound on
the achievable secrecy rate is given as,
R(m)s = Rl−Re
= I [Sm(k);rm(k)]− I [Sm(k);re(k)]
= log2(1+
αm
σ2z
)− log2(1+ γe)
(3.54)
and the received SINR at the eavesdropper is,
γe =
Bˆ
∑
i=1
|l(i)|2αm
B|g(i)m |2
Bˆ
∑
i=1
(B−1)|l(i)|2αm
B|g(i)m |2
+
B
∑
i=Bˆ+1
|l(i)|2α j 6=m
|g(i)j 6=m|2
+σ2e
(3.55)
where Bˆ is the cardinality of yˆ, and l(i) is the channel gain between the eavesdropper and the ith
base-station. The denominator of (3.55) can be explained as follows, the first term represents the
interference due to the insufficient number of collected shares, The second term is the interference
from the shares that are not related to the mth secret, and σ2e is the noise power. While the nominator
represent the amount of leakage about the mth secret.
As we proved in [52], the secrecy outage probability of such system can be given as the
CCDF of a logistic random variable (i.e., Re v Logistic(µ,β )). If we consider an eavesdropper
with a noiseless channel (σ2e = 0), and an equal power distribution for all users, for simplicity,
(αm = α,∀m ∈ [M]), we get,
µ = log2(
B2
B2− Bˆ2 ) β =
Bˆ
B2
, (3.56)
58
and
Pr(Rs ≤ γth) = 1−FRe(Rl− γth)
= 0.5
[
1− tanh
(
Rl− γth−µ
2β
)] (3.57)
where γth is a predefined secrecy rate threshold.
On another perspective, the number of antenna array elements N does not directly affect
the secrecy rate or outage performance. Increasing the number of the elements would results in
the ability to have a narrower information beam, which would reduce the area where transmitted
shares are accessible, also the area where the secret is detectable. Moreover, increasing the number
of element s will allow the system to serve a larger number of users.
3.2.4 Secrecy Performance
Here, we assume that the entries of A and B are independently identically distributed (i.i.d.)
and they follow a complex Gaussian distribution with zero mean and a unit variance. Moreover,
A and B are totally uncorrelated, which is a valid assumption unless the legitimate user and the
eavesdropper are co-located.
For our system performance results, , all users are assumed to be assigned an equal trans-
mission power, σ2j =
P
M ,∀ j ∈ {1,2, . . . ,M}. The analysis of the power allocation for each user
is not considered for this work. Also, the channel of the eavesdropper is always assumed to be
noiseless σ2ne = 0 as a secrecy worst-case scenario.
3.2.4.1 Eavesdropper with a Single Antenna
Fig. 3.11 shows the complementary cumulative distribution function (CCDF) of γ(θ) from
(3.10), with a precoding matrix D =H[H†H]−1A†[AA†]−1. It shows that with a very high proba-
bility, the power of the interfering streams will be much larger than the power of the desired stream
(i.e., P{γ(θ)< 0 dB}).
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Figure 3.11: CCDF of the received SIR. the CCDF curve of the received SIR from a single path at
any random transmission direction θx.
These results induce that the eavesdropper’s channel has lower capacity than the legitimate
user’s channel. Notice that the effect of the noise at the eavesdropper is not considered in these
results, which makes it the best case scenario for the received SINR.
It can be directly inferred that with the increase in the number of users in the system, the
received SINR drops dramatically. The same analysis was carried for the received SINR at the
eavesdropper, γmEaves, expressed by (3.30). In Fig. 3.12, the eavesdropper’s channel suffers from
high degradation with a high probability7.
7Here, we refer to the degradation of the channel as the decrease happens to the value of the received SINR.
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Figure 3.12: CCDF of the received SINR by the eavesdropper.
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Figure 3.13: The change of the average achievable secrecy rate. (Rm) vs. the SNR of the
legitimate user’s channel (γmlegit).
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Fig. 3.13 shows the change of the average achievable secrecy rate expressed by (3.27), with
the change of the SNR at the legitimate user γmLegit. Here, we compare three different schemes of
secrecy namely, GSVD [31], DM, and AN. GSVD is know to achieve the secrecy capacity in case
of full channel knowledge. We can see that the proposed scheme can achieve a secrecy rate closer
to that of the GSVD, compared to the achievable rates when using the AN scheme.
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Figure 3.14: The probability of achieving a positive secrecy rate. P(Rm > 0) against the received
SNR at the legitimate user, for different system configurations.
On the other hand, Fig. 3.14 compares the probability of achieving positive secrecy rates
in the case of using DM, with the AN scheme from [62]. The figure shows that DM outperforms
AN scheme. Also the figure shows the theoretical curves of the DM schemes based on Theorem 1.
We can see that the simulations match the theoretical results. Besides, it can be inferred that after
a certain number of transmit antennas Na, the enhancement of the performance of the AN scheme
is no more significant.
Note that, increasing the number of transmit antennas for AN adds hardware (the number
of required RF chains) and processing complexity. While, for DM, increasing the number of users
M adds processing complexity only and keeps the hardware unchanged.
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Fig. 3.15 shows the effect of the correlation between the legitimate channel and the eaves-
dropper’s channel. As channels are being more correlated, AN loses performance faster than DM.
This indicates that DM is more immune to channel correlation.
Another aspect of comparison is the ability to provide higher secrecy requirements. It
is clear from Fig. 3.16 that DM can provide better performance when there are higher secrecy
requirements. The figure shows that when the minimum secrecy rate threshold γth increases, DM
tends to keep a more stable performance compared to AN.
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Corre lat ion C oeffi c ie nt
P(
R s
>
0)
 
 
DM , M = 3
AN, Na = 8
AN, Na = 10
Figure 3.15: The effect of the channel correlation. the correlation between the channel of the
legitimate user and the channel of the eavesdropper on achieving a positive secrecy rate
P(Rm > 0).
3.2.4.2 Eavesdropper with an Arbitrary Number of Antennas
As mentioned before, Due to the assumption of the availability of channel information
of the legitimate users at the eavesdropper side, the eavesdropper can regenerate the pre-coding
matrix and decode the legitimate data (for NE ≥M) in the case of AN system. For our scheme, we
add another component to the pre-coder, which is exclusively available at the base station.
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Figure 3.16: The secrecy outage probability. the probability for different secrecy requirements
P(Rm < γth).
It is assumed that the eavesdropper has the knowledge about the structure of the antenna
array used at the base station. This means it knows the general structure of the matrix H, but it is
not aware of the values of θl .
Fig. 3.17 shows the probability of having positive secrecy rate for different number of
antennas at the eavesdropper NE . The proposed scheme can still achieve positive secrecy rate for
an eavesdropper with large number of antennas, while the number of elements of the antenna array
is fixed at N = 10.
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Figure 3.17: The probability of achieving positive secrecy rate. The rate for different number of
antennas at the eavesdropper.
3.2.4.3 Multiple Access Secrecy Rate
As discussed before, in the case of perfect knowledge of the channel of each of the users,
the pre-coder is capable of eliminating the effect of each signal on the other non-intended users.
Here, we are showing the effect of channel estimation error on the secrecy performance. To be
more practical, we adopted the channel estimation error model of the LTE system [71]. Fig. 3.18
shows the secrecy sum-rate against the channel estimation error, for different channel structures
and different number of users. It is shown that the increase in the number of users in the system
affects the secrecy rate.
This is due to the increase in the number of interfering signals that leak to the legitimate
data. On the other side, having a more diverse channel helps to maintain some resistance against
estimation error. The diverse channel helps to average the interference imposed on the legitimate
signal, which is a zero-mean random variable.
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Figure 3.18: The Average secrecy sum-rate against the channel estimation error.
3.2.4.4 Secrecy Using CoMP
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Figure 3.19: BER performance contour with 4-QAM and N = 8
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The CoMP scheme requires the signal to be transmitted from several geographically sepa-
rated base stations to provide security so that, along each direction of transmission, the data is not
decodable. Here, we simulate a 100×100 area (K = 104) covered by 3 base-stations (B = 3). The
number of users served in that area is based on the number of used antenna elements (M = N = 8).
The secrecy threshold is chosen as η = 10−2.
Fig. 3.19 shows the simulation of equally separated base stations. The base stations are
configured such that the broadside direction of each antenna array is pointing towards the center of
the equilateral triangular shape of the base stations positions. Using 4-QAM modulation scheme,
contours of the noiseless BER performance for one of the users is shown where circles represent
the users and squares are the base stations.
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Figure 3.20: BER performance contour with 16-QAM and N=8
Fig. 3.20 shows the case where 16-QAM modulation is used. Notice how the secure region
is reduced with increasing the modulation order. To further control the secure area, the number
of activated antenna arrays elements is changed accordingly. Increasing the number of antenna
elements narrows the information beam-width, reducing the vulnerable region as shown next.
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In order to profile the performance of this location-specific security technique, we use the
average VR metric to measure variations of the secure area. Fig. 3.21 shows the effect of varying
the number of antenna elements of the base stations. It is clear that, for a given modulation order, as
the number of elements increases, the VR reduces significantly. Furthermore, different modulation
orders are simulated. As mentioned previously, higher modulation order allows for more confined
VR. Hence, using both: antenna size and modulation order, full control over VR is attained.
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Figure 3.21: Vulnerable region reduction. The change with number of antenna elements for
different modulation orders
3.2.4.5 “Secret-Sharing” Enhanced Performance
The system was simulated over a 50×50 grid with different number of sources (BSs). The
system serves 5 users randomly located over the grid. The secrets consists of QPSK symbols. The
channel gains g(i)m are simulated for two cases, namely, free space fading and frequency selective
channels. The location of the sources will be noted on the figures as blue squares. The area where
the data is decodable is noted using black circles.
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Figure 3.22: BER using two transmitters (case 1). BER for the data of one of the users at the
location (44,22) [inside the black circle]. The secret is shared using two sources [the blue
squares].
Figures 3.22 and 3.23 show the bit-error-rate (BER) values over the grid for two different
users in the system. It is noticeable that the data is decodable in a very limited area around the
location of the desired user, while outside that area the received symbols are almost random.
On the other hand, Figures 3.24 and 3.25 shows the magnitude of the correlation coefficient
between the received signal and the shared secret calculated as,
ρ =
∣∣∣∣ Cov(r(k),Sm(k))var(r(k))var(Sm(k))
∣∣∣∣ . (3.58)
The figures show that the received signal over the whole grid is almost uncorrelated with the shared
secret, except for the area around the desired location. This confirms that the signal received
outside the desired location does not have any form of linear relationship with the shared secret
message.
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Figure 3.23: BER using two transmitters (case 2). BER for the data of one of the users at the
location (44,40) [inside the black circle]. The secret is shared using two sources [the blue
squares].
Figures 3.26, 3.27, 3.28, and 3.29 are similar to the previous figures, but instead of using
only two sources to share the secret, Four sources are being used. The figures show that with the
increase in the number of sources, the area where the message is decodable becomes much smaller.
this can be used as a flexible option based on the secrecy requirements of each user.
Figure 3.30 shows the effect of including channel precoding, in case of a frequency selec-
tive channel. In such case, it is visible that the area where the data is decodable is much small, and
the data received outside the desired location is more randomized.
Figure 3.31 shows the case of a system serving a single user. Even though the area of
detectability is larger, the system is still able to provide secrecy over the most of the other areas.
This elements the possibility that the system relies on multi-user interference only.
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Figure 3.24: Signal correlation using two transmitters (case 1). The magnitude of correlation
coefficient for the data of one of the users at the location (44,22) [inside the black circle]. The
secret is shared using two sources [the blue squares].
Figure 3.32 shows the performance of the system without applying secret sharing scheme.
This figure is provided as a reference for performance. We can see that the area surrounding the
desired location is larger. Moreover, The locations along the line of sight of the source are all
vulnerable.
Figure 3.33 shows the secrecy outage probability of the system with a secrecy threshold
γth = 0. The figure shows that with the increase in the number of sources, the system can achieve
a better outage performance. Also the decrease in the number of detected shares affect the per-
formance significantly. The figure also compares the performance of the proposed scheme to
the widely adopted An scheme [72], which shares the same underlying assumption of the non-
availability of the CSI of the eavesdropper. It’s noticeable that the proposed scheme outperform
the AN scheme, even with less number of resources.
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Figure 3.25: Signal correlation using two transmitters (case 2). The magnitude of correlation
coefficient for the data of one of the users at the location (44,40) [inside the black circle]. The
secret is shared using two sources [the blue squares].
3.3 Beam-Based NOMA
Secrecy was one aspect that directional transmission can enhance, another important aspect
is system capacity. Directional transmission can help elevating the system capacity too. Here we
provide our views on applying the NOMA scheme into directional transmission. Using NOMA
helps achieving a grant free system, and possibly asynchronous transmission. Directionality here
can help reducing the complexity of the multi-user processing. In this section, we will propose a
strategy to integrate the NOMA approach with directional transmission.
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Figure 3.26: BER using four transmitters (case 1). BER for the data of one of the users at the
location (20,35) [inside the black circle]. The secret is shared using four sources [the blue
squares].
3.3.1 Signal Multiplexing
The base-station here is equipped with a uniform linear array (ULA)8 of size N, with el-
ement spacing of d = λ/2, where λ is the carrier wavelength. In beam-space channel model,
the angular domain is divided into N orthogonal basis each representing a physical angle φn [18].
Then, the corresponding channel response is given as,
G=HA†, (3.59)
8The assumption of ULA is made in order to simplify the analysis. The extension to multi-dimensional arrays is a
straight-forward process with the use of the appropriate array response.
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Figure 3.27: BER using four transmitters (case 2). BER for the data of one of the users at the
location (30,26) [inside the black circle]. The secret is shared using four sources [the blue
squares].
where H = {hk,n}K×N is the i.i.d complex gain matrix, and hk,n represents the multi-path effect
between the kth user and the nth transmission angle [73], K is the total number of users, and A
is a unitary matrix which contains the array response of each of the orthogonal basis, and can be
represented as,
A= [a(θ1),a(θ2), . . . ,a(θN)] , (3.60)
where θn = λNd
(
n−1− N−12
)
and φn = arcsin(θn). a(θ) represents the array response vector and
can be given by,
a(θ) =
1√
N
[
1,e− j
2pid
λ θ , . . . ,e− j(N−1)
2pid
λ θ
]T
, (3.61)
Based on this we can transmit N independent data streams towards these different angles,
with the transmitted streams t= {tn}N×1 given as:
t= Ax, (3.62)
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Figure 3.28: Signal correlation using four transmitters (case 1). The magnitude of correlation
coefficient for the data of one of the users at the location (20,35) [inside the black circle]. The
secret is shared using four sources [the blue squares].
where x = {xn}N×1 is the vector containing the N independent streams. A is the precoding ma-
trix which directs each stream towards the associated transmission angles. This resembles the
discrete-Fourier-transform (DFT) process in OFDM system where each data stream is loaded on
the corresponding sub-carrier.
DefiningMn which is the set of all users connected to the base-station through the nth beam.
Also, we defineJk which is the set of all beams connecting the kth user to the base-station9. Then
the data streams are constructed as,
xn = ∑
k∈Mn
√
βk,nPn sk, (3.63)
9We assume that Mn and Jk are known to the base-station through the channel estimation processes, and they
are updated every time the estimation is done. This is applicable as the angle-of-arrival for the signal of each user is
reciprocal to the angle-of-departure.
75
  
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Figure 3.29: Signal correlation using four transmitters (case 2). The magnitude of correlation
coefficient for the data of one of the users at the location (30,26) [inside the black circle]. The
secret is shared using four sources [the blue squares].
where βk,n is the power fraction assigned to the kth user in the nth beam, and sk is baseband mod-
ulated data. Equation (7) represents the superposition process of NOMA towards the nth transmis-
sion direction.
The received signal at the kth user is then given by,
rk = gkt+wk = ∑
n∈Jk
gntn+wk, (3.64)
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Figure 3.30: Effect of channel knowledge on secret sharing approach. BER for the data of one of
the users at the location (16,14) [inside the black circle]. The secret is shared using two sources
[the blue squares].
where gk is the kth row of G representing the channel vector of the kth user, and wk is an additive
white Gaussian noise with zero mean and variance of σ2k . The unitary nature of A results in
Gt=Hx. Then,
rk =hkx+wk = ∑
n∈Jk
hk,nxn+wk,
= ∑
n∈Jk
hk,n
√
βk,nPn sk
+ ∑
n∈Jk
hk,n ∑
m∈Mn
m6=k
√
βm,nPn sm+wk.
(3.65)
The first term of (3.65) represents the sum of all signals belongs to the kth user from all Jk
transmission directions. the second term represents the interference of the superimposed signals
from the other K−1 users.
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Figure 3.31: BER performance for single user case with secrecy sharing. BER for the data of one
of the users at the location (16,33) [inside the black circle]. The secret is shared using two sources
[the blue squares].
As a result, the received SINR γk, at the users with weak channel conditions, will be,
γk =
∑
n∈Jk
∣∣hk,n√βk,nPn∣∣2
∑
n∈Jk
∣∣∣∣hk,n∑m∈Mn
m 6=k
√
βm,nPn
∣∣∣∣2+σ2k
, (3.66)
then the achievable rate is given by.
Rk = log2(1+ γk), (3.67)
Here, we assume that users with higher quality channels are capable of applying perfect
SIC, this lead to an enhanced effective SINR for these users in the form of,
γ∗k =
∑
n∈Jk
∣∣hk,n√βk,nPn∣∣2
σ2k
, (3.68)
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Figure 3.32: BER performance for single user case without secrecy sharing. BER for the data of
one of the users at the location (44,15) [inside the black circle]. The secret is shared using four
sources [the blue squares].
then, the achievable sum rate is given by,
R =
K
∑
k=1
Rk. (3.69)
Theorem 2. The received SINR at any user before applying SIC follows the generalized beta prime
distribution, β ′(a,b,1,c), where,
a = |Jk|0 = Nδ
b = Nδ
(
∑m∈Mn
m 6=k
βm,n+
σ2k
NδPn
)2
(
∑m∈Mn
m 6=k
βm,n
)2
c = βk,n
(
∑m∈Mn
m 6=k
βm,n+
σ2k
NδPn
)
(
∑m∈Mn
m 6=k
βm,n
)2
(3.70)
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Figure 3.33: Outage probability with secret-sharing. Secrecy outage probability of the system for
different number of sources B, and different number of collected shares Bˆ, with secrecy threshold
γth = 0.
Proof. This is a straightforward process. The channel coefficients hn are considered as i.i.d. com-
plex Gaussian random variables (hn ∼N (0,1)), hence,
∑
n∈Jk
βk,nPn|hk,n|2 ∼ Γ
(|Jk|0,Pnβk,n) , (3.71)
similarly,
∑
n∈Jk
Pn
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣hk,n ∑m∈Mn
m 6=k
√
βm,n
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
∼ Γ
|Jk|0,Pn ∑
m∈Mn
m 6=k
βm,n
 , (3.72)
The denominator in (3.66) shifts the mean of (3.72) with the value σ2k , this changes the distribution
in (3.72) to Γ(b, Pnβk,nc ). The ratio of these Gamma random variables follows the generalized beta
prime distribution.
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Corollary 1. The effective SNR after applying SIC follows the Gamma distribution,
Γ
(
|Jk|0, Pnβk,nσ2k
)
.
3.3.2 Power Allocation
Power allocation is one of the most critical parts of any NOMA scheme. Our target here is
to maximize the achievable sum rate, keeping in mind that there is a maximum power constraint
of Pn per beam , this can be formulated as follows,
maximize
β
Rn
subject to ∑
k∈Mn
βk,n ≤ 1.
(3.73)
Sum rate maximization problem is known to be a non-convex problem [74]. Moreover,
here we need to solve two joint issues, the distribution of power between different users, and the
distribution of power between different beams for each of the users.
In order to simplify the problem, we adopt the Max-Min SINR approximation of the prob-
lem in (3.73), which is given as,
maximize
β
min
k
γk
subject to ||β || ≤
√
N.
(3.74)
this problem can be solved using Algorithm 2 [75]. A further simplification can be done by solving
each of these issues separately. In such context, the power factor can be rewritten as βk,n = εknρk,
where ρk represents the portion of power given to the kth user, and εkn is the amount of ρk directed
towards the nth beam.
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Regarding the distribution of the power over the beams for each user, we adopt a water-
filling approach [76]10. So the beam power distribution is given as,
εkn =
 1
L − σ2k|hk,n|2

+
∀n ∈Jk (3.75)
whereL is the Lagrange multiplier chosen to ensure the power constraint ∑n∈Jk ε
k
n = 1.
Afterwards, p= [ρ1,ρ2, . . . ,ρK] is found as,
maximize
p
min
k
γk
subject to |p| ≤ 1,
(3.76)
similarly, this can be solved using Algorithm 2.
Another aspect, which a concern in this scheme, is the number of active beams per user
|Jk|0. More precisely, the ratio between the active beams and and the total number of beams
which we note as the activation ratio (0 < δ ≤ 1). With the value of δ approaches unity, this
means that each user almost has interference from all other users in the system, which will degrade
the performance of the system.
Algorithm 2 Max-Min SINR
1: Update power p(l+1):
2: ρk(l+1)← ρk(l+1)γk(p(l)) ∀k
3: Normalize p(l+1):
4: ρk(l+1)← ρk(l+1)maxi ρi(l+1) ∀k
On the other hand, if the value of δ moves towards zero, this means that the interference
will be limited, but the system may not be able to provide enough diversity to all users in the
system. Limited diversity may favor some users compared to others, which may cause a poor
fairness performance.
10This step represents the case where the kth user is assigned pk power fraction of the total power, hence, how would
that fraction be distributed over the different beams serving the kth user.
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Another approach for optimizing the power allocation could be based on weighted sum
rate,
maximize
β
1
N
K
∑
k=1
µkRk
subject to ∑
k∈Mn
βk,n ≤ 1.
(3.77)
where µk is a predefined priority factor of the kth user. This approach could achieve a better fairness
between users. The predefined priority factors µ can be calculated based on either the quality of
service (QoS) requirements of each user, or the average rate achieved by a user over a certain
amount of time.
3.3.3 Performance
In order to be able to compare to the MIMO-NOMA and MIMO-OMA, we assume the
total number of users K is twice the number of the available beams (i.e., K = 2N). The MIMO-
OMA users are assumed to share the resources equally, so each of them is only allowed half of the
spatial resources. The achievable sum rate of the K users then is normalized to the total number of
available beams. The cell is serving 2N users which are randomly distributed over the area covered
by that cell. The distribution of the users in the cell follows a Poisson point process as adopted by
cellular systems.
Figure 3.34 shows the average sum rate per channel use against the average SNR (i.e.,
transmit SNR NδPnσ2 ). As previously mentioned the activation ratio δ highly affect the performance
of the system. From the figure, we can see that the increase of that ratio reduces the gain of the
system compared to NOMA, which is expected as the number of interfering users per beam is
increasing. On the other side, low values of δ allow the system to achieve higher rates.
Furthermore, figure 3.34 shows that the adoption of the joint power optimization approach
would yield a better overall performance for the proposed system. the enhanced performance for
the lower δ values suggested that the system is more suitable for sparse channel, which is an
adopted feature for mm-wave environments.
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Figure 3.34: Average sum rate. The figure compares the Sum rate to the current state of the art.
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Figure 3.35: Weak link average rate. The figure shows the change of the weak link rate.
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Figure 3.35 shows the effect of the activation ratio on the weak users of the system. Even
though, the lower activation ratio provide a better overall performance for the system, the achiev-
able rate for the weak users is limited, which as explained before may be the result of low diversity
order. On the other hand, a higher activation ratio allow weak users to achieve better rates, but on
the expense of lower overall performance.
On the other hand, figure 3.36 shows the effect of the activation ratio on user with the
best link condition in the system. Unlike the user with the weakest link condition, increasing the
activation ratio reduce the achievable rate. This is due the effect of the increased interference in
the system, which reduces the overall performance. Also, by allowing more diversity, The power
is distributed over more links, which reduces the overall portion of power given to that user.
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Figure 3.36: Strong link average rate. The figure shows the change of the strong link rate.
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Figure 3.37 shows how the beam activation ratio affect the average rates of the strongest
and weakest links of the system. Different users have different optimum values for δ , which make
an application-based optimization for the activation ratio is necessary11. On another side, mm-
wave channels have a sparse structure, which will keep the system operational at lower values of
δ by default.
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Figure 3.37: Activation ratio effect. The figure shows the effect of activation ratio on the rate of
different links.
11the optimization of the activation ratio, and the associated active beams assignments are considered as a future
extension for this work.
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Chapter 4: Industrial Experience:
3GPP-NR Uplink Physical Control Channels and Signals
During Summer/Fall 2018, I was blessed to have the opportunity to work at Intel corpo-
ration as an Intern. I worked under the next generation and standards group, to develop and test
physical layer algorithms for 5G-NR based communications units. This chapter briefly discuss the
main concepts I worked on during my Internship.
Table 4.1: Structure of 5G-NR PUCCH formats
Structure of PUCCH Formats
Format # OFDM symbols # Physical Resource Blocks # Bits
0 1→ 2 1 ≤ 2+SR
1 4→ 14 1 ≤ 2
2 1→ 2 1→ 16 > 2
3/4 4→ 14 1→ 16 > 2
4.1 Physical Uplink Control Channel (PUCCH)
Uplink control channel is used to provide three main information data from the UE to
the base-station, namely, hybrid automatic repeat request (HARQ), scheduling request (SR), and
channel state information(CSI). Furthermore, CQI carries some indicators, namely, rank indicator
(RI), precoding matrix indicator (PMI), channel quality indicator (CQI). In order to feedback these
information to the gNB, NR provides 5 different formats that can be used by the UE, as shown
in Table 4.1 [77]. The available formats, there structure, and uses are described in the following
sections.
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4.1.1 Format 0
Format 0 adopts a sequence based transmission scheme. This format is a short duration
format, which spans only up to 2 OFDM symbols. It can be used to transmit 1 or 2 HARQ bits,
in addition to a SR flag. The occupied symbols are allocated starting from the end of the slot, and
spans a single physical resource block (PRB).
Figure 4.1: Format 0 bit mapping.
A length 12 low PAPR base sequence is used to transmit the HARQ and SR information.
Each combination of bits is given a different cyclic shift of that base sequence, as shown in figure
4.1 [78]. With active SR an additional shift is presented to the sequence.Even though, the demod-
ulation reference signals(DMRS) based approach shows better performance for low delay spread
channels,the sequence based approach reduce the overhead imposed in case of using DMRS. Also,
it avoids the error propagation caused from the channel estimation errors. Moreover, the perfor-
mance of the sequence based approach is superior in long delay spread channels [79].
In order for the receiver to retrieve this information, an algorithm is required to detect the
corresponding cyclic shift. The performance of the HARQ processes is measured using ACK error
rate (i.e., missed ACKs and ACK-to-NACK errors), False alarm rate (i.e., DTX-to-ACK errors),
and NACK-to-ACK error rate. A correlation-based receiver can be used to detect the cyclic shift
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as follows,
mcs = argmax
m
c(m) =
|r·s∗m|
||r||2 ≥ cth, (4.1)
where r is the received sequence, sm is the base sequence with a cyclic shift equal to m, and
m = {0,1, . . . ,11}. The false alarm threshold cth = f (n,Pf a) is a function of the diversity order
n and false alarm probability Pf a. The standard contributions suggest the false alarm rate to be
set to 10−2. The threshold cth is an inverse incomplete-gamma-function, which doesn’t have a
closed-form but can be approximated.
4.1.2 Format 2
Another short duration format is format 2. Similar to format 0 it can occupy up to 2 OFDM
symbols with frequency hopping optional, but it can span up to 16 PRB. Format 2 has a DMRS-
based structure as shown in figure 4.2, with DMRS symbols inserted every third subcarrier. UCI
bits are channel coded before being modulated to QPSK symbols. This format support the trans-
mission of UCI bit load larger than 2 bits.
Figure 4.2: Grid structure of format 2.
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As the structure spans a very short duration in time (1 or 2 symbols), High values of fre-
quency offset/Doppler shift will not leave a significant effect on the performance. on the other
hand, the occupied frequency is relatively large, which makes the performance considerably af-
fected in case of the existence of large time-offset values.The 1/3 (DMRS/UCI) ratio provide
decent amount of resources to perform parameters estimation processes.
Time-offset needs to be estimated and corrected before the channel estimation step. a
simple DMRS sample correlation approach can provide a reliable estimate for time-offset. Another
parameter that is required before channel estimation is the SNR. SNR can be estimated using a
simple moments-based estimator [80]. After eliminating the the time-offset rotation, the SNR can
be used to generate a channel estimate for UCI samples, which in turn will be used to demodulate
these samples.
4.1.3 Format 1
Format 1 is a long duration format spanning 4 to 14 OFDM symbols. It supports the
transmission of up to 2 UCI bits, and it occupies a single PRB. DMRS samples are distributed to
occupy the whole frequency band every other OFDM symbol, as shown in figure 4.3. This high
density of DMRS samples provides very high reliability for parameters estimation. Moreover, the
high repetition rate of the UCI bits provides a high coding gain. The UCI are directly modulated
to either BPSK or QPSK symbols. Format 1 also supports multi-user multiplexing over the same
resources using OCC spreading codes.
As format 1 structure span only a single PRB, only high time-offset values would affect its
performance. Therefore a precise time-offset estimation is not needed, only a hypotheses testing
for a limited number of values could be sufficient (e.g., {0,0.25,0.5} CP length). With the frequent
DMRS time allocation, a reliable frequency-offset estimation and correction can be implemented.
Then, the channel can be estimated over the DMRS symbols, and interpolated over UCI data
symbols. The high density of DMRS symbols can provide a reliable SNR estimate to assist channel
estimation.
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Figure 4.3: Grid structure of format 1.
4.1.4 Formats 3/4
The other long duration formats are 3/4. both formats share the same grid structure, but
format 4 support multi-user multiplexing, while format 3 doe snot support that option. These
formats are used to transmit UCI data of a size larger than 2 bits. Similar to format 1, they can
occupy up to 14 OFDM symbols and span up to 16 PRB. DMRS symbols are inserted in the middle
of each slot, with the option of having additional DMRS symbols. Figure 4.4 shows an example
for the DMRS placement in case of 10 OFDM symbols, for both options.
With the high density of the DMRS in the frequency domain, a reliable time-offset and
SNR estimates can be obtained. A frequency-offset would be possible to obtain in certain cases,
but not always. To get a frequency offset estimate, either the additional DMRS option should be
active, or the frequency hopping should not be active. So, these formats are not suggested for high
mobility applications.
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Figure 4.4: Grid structure example of formats 3/4.
4.2 Sounding Reference Signal (SRS)
SRS is sent from the UE to the gNB in order to provide means of uplink channel evaluation.
Based on the channel quality induced from SRS at gNB, the gNB can decide on the scheduling
information for each UE. These information include the RI, TPMI, and MCS. based on these
information, the gNB assign a transmission band, modulation scheme, coding rate, and spatial
precoding matrix. Also, it sends this information to the UE in the PDDCH, in order to be able to
decode the data. In order to be able to link the channel quality to the relative parameter a calibration
process is required in order to meet either a quality of service goal or an error rate target.
Figure 4.5 shows the grid structure of the SRS signals. SRS can occupy either 1, 2, and 4
OFDM symbols. These symbols can span between 4 and 272 PRBs. As shown in the figure,SRS
has to modes of multiplexing, namely, ’Comb 2’ and ’Comb 4’. The Comb size defines the fre-
quency spacing for each SRS signal, and in turn the number of SRS signals that can be multiplexed
on the same symbol.
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The received SRS signal can be used for parameter estimation (e.g., SNR, time-offset,
frequency-offset, antenna correlation). These estimates can be used along with the SRS signal to
estimate the channel. Then, using the estimated channel and the available set of precoding matrices
to generate a dictionary for all possible effective channels. The effective channel that yields the
best capacity is determined and the corresponding PMI and RI are selected. Then, based on the
capacity value, the highest MSC value that can achieve the desired Qos requirement is selected.
Figure 4.5: Grid structure of SRS.
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Chapter 5: Concluding Remarks
In this dissertation, we provided an overview of the usage of directional transmission to en-
hance the quality of wireless communication systems, and provide secrecy through physical layer
processing. A review for all the related topics was provided to ensure a solid background for the
basics of this topic. We revised the basics of multiple- antenna systems and related channel mod-
els. Moreover, we reviewed the basics of physical layer security and how multiple antenna systems
can contribute to providing secrecy. Also, we covered non-orthogonal multiple access, which is
recently considered one of the enabling technologies for ultra-low-latency communications, and
how multiple antenna systems can help to enhance its performance.
Based on the provided literature review, we proposed several approaches to enhance both
secrecy and system capacity. First, we provided a new scheme for transmitting multiple data
stream towards multiple directions, simultaneously, using the directional modulation approach.
The scheme is capable of providing an independent and secure communication link for each trans-
mission direction. Moreover, we were able to reduce the complexity of the transmission scheme
using a DFT based synthesis module.
Using the multiple directions approach, we introduced a location-based secrecy system.
This system can be utilized either in a single cell system or in a centralized/cloud radio access
network (C-RAN). The system can provide a secure geographical region for each legitimate user
in the network, through joint transmission processing between all transmission nodes. To further
enhance the performance, we added multiple node cryptography that makes it highly unlikely for
eavesdroppers to acquire any information.
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For enhancing system capacity, we proposed a directional based NOMA scheme. The
scheme is aimed to reduce the load imposed on the scheduler by the user pairing approach. More-
over, the scheme allows the pairing of more than two users over the same resource and can provide
rates close to the state of the art systems. Finally, to grasp the experience acquired on the internship
at Intel corporation, we provided an overview of the uplink physical channels and signals and the
related design aspects.
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